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Part 1 
Overview: 
Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook
The U.S. economy weakened markedly in the second 
half of 2008 as the turmoil in ﬁ  nancial markets inten-
siﬁ  ed, credit conditions tightened further, and asset 
values continued to slump. Conditions in the labor 
market worsened signiﬁ  cantly after early autumn, and 
nearly all major sectors of the economy registered steep 
declines in activity late last year. Meanwhile, inﬂ  ation 
pressures diminished appreciably as prices of energy 
and other commodities dropped sharply, the margin of 
resource slack in the economy widened, and the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar strengthened.
  The second half of 2008 saw an intensiﬁ  cation of 
the ﬁ  nancial and economic strains that had initially 
been triggered by the end of the housing boom in the 
United States and other countries and the associated 
problems in mortgage markets. The ensuing turmoil in 
global credit markets affected asset values, credit condi-
tions, and business and consumer conﬁ  dence around the 
world. Over the summer, a weakening U.S. economy 
and continued ﬁ  nancial turbulence led to a broad loss 
of conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial sector. In September, the 
government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship by their 
regulator, and Lehman Brothers Holdings ﬁ  led for 
bankruptcy. The insurance company American Inter-
national Group, Inc., or AIG, also came under severe 
pressure, and the Federal Reserve, with the full support 
of the Treasury, agreed to provide substantial liquidity 
to the company. In addition, a number of other ﬁ  nancial 
institutions failed or were acquired by competitors. As 
a result of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, a promi-
nent money market mutual fund suffered capital losses, 
which prompted investors to withdraw large amounts 
from such funds. The resulting massive outﬂ  ows under-
mined the stability of short-term funding markets, 
particularly the commercial paper market, upon which 
corporations rely heavily to meet their short-term bor-
rowing needs. Against this backdrop, investors pulled 
back broadly from risk-taking in September and Octo-
ber, liquidity in short-term funding markets vanished for 
a time, and prices plunged across asset classes. Securiti-
zation markets, with the exception of those for 
government-supported mortgages, essentially shut 
down. 
 Reﬂ  ecting in part the adverse developments in 
ﬁ  nancial markets, economic activity dropped sharply in 
late 2008 and has continued to contract so far in 2009. 
In the labor market, the pace of job losses quickened 
considerably beginning last autumn, the unemployment 
rate has risen to its highest level since the early 1990s, 
and other measures of labor market conditions—for 
example, the number of persons working part time 
because full-time jobs are not available—have wors-
ened noticeably. The deteriorating job market, along 
with the sizable losses of equity and housing wealth 
and the tightening of credit conditions, has depressed 
consumer sentiment and spending; these factors have 
also contributed to the continued steep decline in hous-
ing activity. In addition, businesses have instituted 
widespread cutbacks in capital spending in response to 
the weakening outlook for sales and production as well 
as the difﬁ  cult credit environment. And in contrast to 
the ﬁ  rst half of the year—when robust demand for U.S. 
exports provided some offset to the softness in domestic 
demand—exports slumped in the second half as eco-
nomic activity abroad fell. In all, real gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the United States declined slightly in 
the third quarter of 2008 and is currently estimated by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis to have dropped at 
an annual rate of 3¾ percent in the fourth quarter; real 
GDP seems headed for another considerable decrease in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009.
  The downturn in sales and production, along with 
steep declines in the prices of energy and other com-
modities and a strengthening in the exchange value of 
the dollar, has contributed to a substantial lessening of 
inﬂ  ation pressures in the past several months. Indeed, 
overall inﬂ  ation, as measured by the price index for 
personal consumption expenditures, turned negative 
in the fourth quarter of 2008; over the ﬁ  rst three quar-
ters of the year, overall inﬂ  ation had averaged nearly 
4½ percent at an annual rate, largely because of sharp 
increases in food and energy prices. Core inﬂ  ation—
which excludes the direct effects of movements in food 
and energy prices—also slowed signiﬁ  cantly late last 
year and entered 2009 at a subdued pace. Mirroring the 
drop in headline inﬂ  ation, survey measures of near-term 
inﬂ  ation expectations have fallen to very low levels in 2  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009
recent months, while the latest readings on longer-term 
inﬂ  ation expectations are similar to those in 2007 and 
early 2008.
  The Federal Reserve has responded forcefully to the 
crisis since its emergence in the summer of 2007. By 
the middle of last year, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) had lowered the federal funds rate 
325 basis points.1 And as indications of economic weak-
ness proliferated and the ﬁ  nancial turbulence intensi-
ﬁ  ed in the second half, the FOMC continued to ease 
monetary policy aggressively; at its December meeting, 
the Committee established a target range for the federal 
funds rate of 0 to ¼ percent and indicated that economic 
conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels 
of the federal funds rate for some time.
  In addition, the Federal Reserve took a number of 
measures during the second half of 2008 to shore up 
ﬁ  nancial markets and support the ﬂ  ow of credit to busi-
nesses and households. (See the appendix for descrip-
tions of these programs.)  In response to intensiﬁ  ed 
stresses in dollar funding markets, the Federal Reserve 
announced extensions of its Term Auction Facility and 
signiﬁ  cantly expanded its network of liquidity swap 
lines with foreign central banks. To support the func-
tioning of the commercial paper market in the after-
math of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Federal 
Reserve established the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
in September as well as the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility and Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
in October. In an effort to restart certain securitization 
markets and support extensions of credit to consum-
ers, the Federal Reserve in November announced the 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which 
is scheduled to begin operation in coming weeks. To 
support the mortgage and housing markets and the 
economy more broadly and to encourage better func-
tioning in the market for agency securities, the Federal 
Reserve announced programs in November to purchase 
agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and 
agency debt. These initiatives have resulted in a notable 
expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, and 
the FOMC has indicated that it expects the size of the 
balance sheet to remain at a high level for some time as 
a result of open market operations and other measures 
to support ﬁ  nancial markets and to provide additional 
stimulus to the economy in an environment of very low 
short-term interest rates.
  Other U.S. government entities and foreign govern-
ments also implemented a variety of policy measures 
in response to the intensiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial strains 
over the course of the fall and winter. The Treasury 
announced a temporary guarantee of the share prices of 
money market mutual funds and, beginning in October, 
used authority granted under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act to purchase preferred shares in a large 
number of depository institutions. That same month, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) intro-
duced a Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program under 
which it offers guarantees for selected senior unsecured 
obligations of participating insured depository institu-
tions and many of their parent holding companies as 
well as for all balances in non-interest-bearing transac-
tion deposit accounts at participating insured deposi-
tory institutions. In November, Citigroup came under 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial pressure. In response, the FDIC, the 
Treasury, and the Federal Reserve provided a package 
of loans and guarantees to bolster Citigroup’s ﬁ  nancial 
condition; a similar package was arranged for Bank of 
America in January. Since October, governments in 
many advanced economies have announced support 
plans for their banking systems. These programs have 
included large-scale capital injections, expansions of 
deposit insurance, and guarantees of some forms of 
bank debt.
  The measures taken by the Federal Reserve, other 
U.S. government entities, and foreign governments 
have helped restore a degree of stability to some ﬁ  nan-
cial markets. In particular, strains in short-term fund-
ing markets have eased noticeably since the fall, some 
corporate risk spreads have declined modestly, and 
measures of volatility have generally retreated. Never-
theless, signiﬁ  cant stress persists in most markets, and 
ﬁ  nancial institutions remain under considerable pres-
sure; as a result, the ﬂ  ow of credit to households and 
businesses continues to be impaired.
  In conjunction with the January 2009 FOMC meet-
ing, the members of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and presidents of the Federal 
Reserve Banks, all of whom participate in FOMC meet-
ings, provided projections for economic growth, unem-
ployment, and inﬂ  ation; these projections are presented 
in part 4 of this report. Given the strength of the forces 
weighing on the economy, FOMC participants viewed 
the outlook as having weakened signiﬁ  cantly in recent 
months. Participants generally expected economic 
activity to contract sharply in the near term and then 
to move onto a path of gradual recovery, bolstered by 
monetary easing, government efforts to stabilize ﬁ  nan-
cial markets, and ﬁ  scal stimulus. Participants expected 
total and core inﬂ  ation to be lower in 2009 than over 
the four quarters of 2008, in large measure because 
of the recent declines in commodity prices and rising  1. A list of abbreviations is available at the end of this report.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  3
slack in resource utilization; inﬂ  ation was forecast to 
remain low in 2010 and 2011. Participants generally 
judged that the degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
outlook for both economic activity and inﬂ  ation was 
greater than historical norms. Most participants viewed 
the risks to growth as skewed to the downside, and 
nearly all saw the risks to the inﬂ  ation outlook as either 
balanced or tilted to the downside. Participants also 
reported their assessments of the rates to which macro-
economic variables would be expected to converge over 
the longer run under appropriate monetary policy and in 
the absence of further shocks to the economy. The cen-
tral tendencies of these longer-run projections were 
2.5 percent to 2.7 percent for real GDP growth, 4.8 per-
cent to 5.0 percent for the unemployment rate, and 
1.7 percent to 2.0 percent for the inﬂ  ation rate.4  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  5
Part 2 
Recent Financial and Economic Developments
The downturn in economic activity that has been unfold-
ing since late 2007 steepened appreciably in the second 
half of 2008 as the strains in ﬁ  nancial markets inten-
siﬁ  ed. After the ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties experienced by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the summer and 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings in mid-
September, short-term funding markets were severely 
disrupted, risk spreads shot up, equity prices plunged, 
and markets for private asset-backed securities remained 
largely shut down. As a result, pressures on the already 
strained balance sheets of ﬁ  nancial institutions increased, 
thereby threatening the viability of some institutions and 
impinging on the ﬂ  ow of credit to households and busi-
nesses. In part reﬂ  ecting the cascading effects of these 
developments throughout the wider economy, conditions 
in the labor market deteriorated markedly. Moreover, 
industrial production contracted sharply as manufactur-
ers responded aggressively to declines in both domestic 
and foreign demand. According to the advance estimate 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, real gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell at an annual rate of 3¾ per-
cent in the fourth quarter, and it seems headed for anoth-
er sizable decrease in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 (ﬁ  gure 1). 
Meanwhile, inﬂ  ation pressures have diminished as prices 
of energy and other commodities have plummeted, the 
margin of resource slack has widened, and the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar has strengthened (ﬁ  gure 2).
  In response to the extraordinary ﬁ  nancial strains, the 
Federal Reserve implemented a number of unprecedent-
ed policy initiatives to support ﬁ  nancial stability and 
promote economic growth. These initiatives included 
lowering the target for the federal funds rate to a range 
of 0 to ¼ percent, beginning direct purchases of agency 
debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, broaden-
ing liquidity programs to ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and 
other central banks, and initiating programs in support 
of systemically important market segments. Other U.S. 
government entities also undertook extraordinary initia-
tives to support the ﬁ  nancial sector by injecting capital 
into the banking system and providing guarantees on 
selected liabilities of depository institutions. Many for-
eign central banks and governments took similar steps. 
Although these actions have helped restore a measure 
of stability to some markets, ﬁ  nancial conditions remain 
quite stressed, and aggregate credit conditions continue 
to be impaired as a result. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEVELOPMENTS
Evolution of the Financial Turmoil
The current period of pronounced turmoil in ﬁ  nancial 
markets began in the summer of 2007 after a rapid 
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consumption expenditures, 2002–08  
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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caused largely by a downturn in house prices in some 
parts of the country.  Investors pulled back from risk-
taking, and liquidity diminished sharply in the markets 
for interbank funding and structured credit products 
more generally. House prices continued to fall rapidly 
in the ﬁ  rst part of 2008, mortgage delinquencies and 
defaults continued to climb, and concerns about credit 
risk mounted. The increased ﬁ  nancial strains led to a 
liquidity crisis in March at The Bear Stearns Compa-
nies, Inc., a major investment bank, and to its acquisi-
tion by JPMorgan Chase & Co. Subsequent aggressive 
monetary policy easing and measures taken by the Fed-
eral Reserve to bolster the liquidity of ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions contributed to some recovery in ﬁ  nancial markets 
during the spring.
  Nevertheless, strains in ﬁ  nancial conditions intensi-
ﬁ  ed going into the second half of the year. In particular, 
amid worries that the capital of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac would be insufﬁ  cient to absorb mounting losses 
on their mortgage portfolios, the stock prices of the 
two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) began 
to decline signiﬁ  cantly in June, and their credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads—which reﬂ  ect investors’ assess-
ments of the likelihood of the GSEs defaulting on their 
debt obligations—rose sharply. Market anxiety eased 
somewhat in the second half of July after the Treasury 
proposed statutory changes, subsequently approved by 
the Congress, under which it could lend and provide 
capital to the GSEs. Nevertheless, pressures on these 
enterprises continued over the course of the summer; as 
a result, option-adjusted spreads on agency-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) widened and inter-
est rates on residential mortgages rose further (ﬁ  gure 3).
  Meanwhile, investor unease about the outlook for the 
broader banking sector reemerged. In July, the failure of 
IndyMac Federal Bank, a large thrift institution, raised 
further concerns about the proﬁ  tability and asset quality 
of many ﬁ  nancial institutions. Over the summer, CDS 
spreads for major investment and commercial banks 
rose, several large institutions announced sharp declines 
in earnings, and anecdotal reports suggested that the 
ability of most ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms to raise new capital was 
limited (ﬁ  gure 4). With banks reluctant to lend to one 
another, conditions in short-term funding markets con-
tinued to be strained during the summer. The relative 
cost of borrowing in the interbank market—as exem-
pliﬁ  ed by the London interbank offered rate (Libor), a 
reference rate for a wide variety of contracts, including 
ﬂ  oating-rate mortgages—increased sharply (ﬁ  gure 5).2 
In addition, required margins of collateral (known as 
haircuts) and bid-asked spreads widened in the markets 
for repurchase agreements (repos) backed by many types 
of securities, including agency securities that previously 
were considered very safe and liquid.
  On September 7, the Treasury and the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency announced that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac had been placed into conservatorship. To 
maintain the GSEs’ ability to purchase home mortgages, 
the Treasury announced plans to establish a backstop 












3. Spreads on 10-year Fannie Mae debt and option-adjusted 
spreads on Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities,  
2007–09  
MBS
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 18, 2009. The
spreads are over Treasury securities of comparable maturities. MBS are
mortgage-backed securities. 
SOURCE: For MBS, Bloomberg; for debt, Merrill Lynch and the Federal















4. Spreads on credit default swaps for selected U.S.  
financial companies, 2007–09  
Investment banks
Jan. Apr. July Oct. Jan. Apr. July Oct. Jan.
NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 18, 2009. Median
spreads for six bank holding companies and nine investment banks. 
SOURCE: Markit.  2.  Typically, the relative cost is measured by comparing the Libor 
rate with the rate on comparable-maturity overnight index swaps.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  7
lion of preferred stock in each of the two ﬁ  rms, and to 
initiate a program to purchase agency MBS. After the 
announcement, interest rate spreads on GSE debt nar-
rowed as investors became conﬁ  dent that the Treasury 
would support the obligations of the GSEs. Option-ad-
justed interest rate spreads on MBS issued by the GSEs 
fell, and rates and spreads on new conforming ﬁ  xed-rate 
mortgages declined. Nevertheless, other ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions continued to face difﬁ  culties in obtaining liquid-
ity and capital as investors remained anxious about their 
solvency and, more broadly, about the implications of 
worsening ﬁ  nancial conditions for the availability of 
credit to households and businesses and so for the eco-
nomic outlook.
  Amid this broad downturn in investor conﬁ  dence, 
and after large mortgage-related losses in the third 
quarter, Lehman Brothers came under pressure as coun-
terparties refused to provide short-term funding to the 
investment bank, even on a secured basis. Eventually, 
with no other ﬁ  rm willing to acquire it and with its bor-
rowing capacity limited by a lack of collateral, Lehman 
Brothers ﬁ  led for bankruptcy on September 15.3 Over 
the previous weekend, Bank of America announced its 
intention to acquire Merrill Lynch, which had also come 
under severe funding pressures. In large part because 
of losses on Lehman Brothers’ debt, the net asset value 
of a major money market mutual fund fell below $1 per 
share—also known as “breaking the buck,” an event 
that had not occurred in many years—thereby prompt-
ing rapid and widespread investor withdrawals from 
prime funds (that is, money market mutual funds that 
hold primarily private assets) (ﬁ  gure 6). Prime funds 
responded to the surge in redemptions by reducing their 
purchases of short-term assets, including commercial 
paper—which many businesses use to obtain working 
capital—and by shortening the maturity of those instru-
ments that they did purchase, leading to a deterioration 
of the commercial paper market (ﬁ  gure 7). Meanwhile, 
investors increasingly demanded safe assets, and funds 
that hold only Treasury securities experienced a sharp 
increase in inﬂ  ows, which caused yields on Treasury 
bills to plummet. Intense demands among investors to 
hold Treasury securities, coupled with increased con-
cerns about counterparty credit risk, reportedly led to 
a substantial scaling back of activity among traditional 
securities lenders in the Treasury market. The decreased 
activity contributed, in turn, to disruptions in the Trea-
sury repo and cash markets that were evidenced by a 
very high volume of fails-to-deliver. Redemptions from 
prime funds slowed after the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve took actions in September and October to sup-
port these funds (see the appendix).
  Around the same time that the difﬁ  culties at Lehman 
Brothers emerged, the ﬁ  nancial condition of American 
International Group, Inc., or AIG—a large, complex 
insurance conglomerate—deteriorated rapidly, and the 
company found short-term funding, upon which it was 
heavily reliant, increasingly difﬁ  cult to obtain. In view 
3.  The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the conservatorship 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac constituted credit events of unprec-
edented scale for the CDS market. Nevertheless, settlement of the 
outstanding CDS contracts on these entities proceeded smoothly over 
the subsequent weeks, apparently due in part to the increased margins 



















5. Libor minus overnight index swap rate, 2007–09  
One-year
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 19, 2009. An
overnight index swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap with the floating rate tied
to an index of daily overnight rates, such as the effective federal funds rate.
At maturity, two parties exchange, on the basis of the agreed notional
amount, the difference between interest accrued at the fixed rate and interest
accrued by averaging the floating, or index, rate. Libor is the London
interbank offered rate. 











6. Net flows into taxable U.S. money market mutual  
funds, 2008–09  
July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb.
Total
NOTE: Data are weekly and extend through February 13, 2009. 
SOURCE: iMoneyNet. 
Government funds
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of the likely spillover effects to other ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions of a disorderly failure of AIG and the potential for 
signiﬁ  cant pass-through effects to the broader economy, 
the Federal Reserve Board on September 16, with the 
full support of the Treasury, authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion 
to the ﬁ  rm to assist it in meeting its obligations and 
to facilitate the orderly sale of some of its businesses. 
(AIG, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve later modi-
ﬁ  ed the terms of this arrangement, as described in the 
appendix.)  Meanwhile, CDS spreads for other insur-
ance companies rose, and their equity prices fell, amid 
concerns regarding their proﬁ  tability and declines in the 
values of their investment portfolios (ﬁ  gure 8).
  Investor anxiety about investment banks, which 
had escalated rapidly in the wake of Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse, abated somewhat after Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs were granted bank holding company 
charters by the Federal Reserve. However, on Septem-
ber 25 the resolution of another failing ﬁ  nancial institu-
tion, Washington Mutual, imposed signiﬁ  cant losses 
on senior and subordinated debt holders as well as on 
shareholders. As a consequence, investors marked down 
their expectations regarding likely government sup-
port for the unsecured nondeposit liabilities of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, which further inhibited the ability of some 
banking organizations to obtain funding. Among these 
institutions was Wachovia Corp., the parent company 
of the fourth-largest U.S. bank by asset size at the time, 
which was ultimately acquired by Wells Fargo in early 
October.
  Against this backdrop, investors pulled back from 
risk-taking even further, funding markets for terms 
beyond overnight largely ceased to function, and a 
wide variety of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms experienced increasing 
difﬁ  culty in obtaining funds and raising capital. Libor 
rates rose at all maturities while comparable-maturity 
overnight index swap (OIS) rates fell, leaving spreads 
at record levels. Strains were also evident in the federal 
funds market, in which overnight funds traded over 
an unusually wide range and activity in term funds 
dropped sharply. Conditions in repo markets worsened 
further, as haircuts and bid-asked spreads on non-
Treasury collateral increased, and the overnight rate on 
general Treasury collateral traded near zero. Despite 
substantial new issuance, yields on short-dated Trea-
sury bills also traded near zero. Fails-to-deliver in the 
Treasury market and overnight lending of securities 
from the portfolio of the System Open Market Account 
soared to record highs. Spreads on asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP) and on lower-rated unsecured 
commercial paper issued by nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms widened 
signiﬁ  cantly.
  Conditions in other ﬁ  nancial markets also deterio-
rated sharply in September and October. CDS spreads 
on corporate debt surged, and the rates on investment-
grade and high-yield bonds rose dramatically rela-
tive to comparable-maturity Treasury yields (ﬁ  gure 
9). Secondary-market bid prices for leveraged loans 
dropped to record-low levels as institutional investors 
pulled back from the market, and the implied spread 
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NOTE: The data are weekly and extend through February 18, 2009.
Commercial paper yield spreads are for an overnight maturity and are
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8. Prices of exchange-traded funds on selected U.S.  
financial sectors, 2007–09  
Insurance companies
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 18, 2009; they
cover 24 banks and 24 insurance companies. 
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widened to record levels (ﬁ  gure 10). Bid-asked spreads 
on high-yield corporate bonds and leveraged loans 
increased signiﬁ  cantly, and liquidity and price discov-
ery in the CDS market remained impaired, especially 
for contracts involving ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Spreads on 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and 
consumer asset-backed securities (ABS) also widened 
dramatically, as securitizations other than government-
supported MBS came to a standstill (ﬁ  gure 11). The tur-
moil affected even the Treasury market, in which interest 
rate spreads between yields on the most recently issued 
Treasury securities and yields on comparable-maturity 
off-the-run securities (that is, those securities that were 
previously issued)—an indicator of the liquidity in this 
market—surged from already elevated levels. Foreign 
ﬁ  nancial markets experienced many of the same distur-
bances as domestic markets (see the section “Interna-
tional Developments”). Price movements in all of these 
markets were likely exacerbated by sales of securities 
by hedge funds and other leveraged market participants 
in an attempt to meet mounting redemption requests on 
the part of their investors and other funding needs. 
  In the stock market, prices tumbled and volatility 
soared to record levels during the autumn as investors 
grew more concerned about the prospects of ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms and about the likelihood of a deep and prolonged 
recession (ﬁ  gures 12 and 13). Equity-price declines 
were particularly pronounced among ﬁ  nancial and 
energy ﬁ  rms, but they were generally widespread across 
sectors and were accompanied by substantial net out-
ﬂ  ows from equity mutual funds. During this period, 
the premium that investors demanded for holding 
equity shares—gauged roughly by the gap between the 
earnings-price ratio and the yield on Treasury securi-
ties—shot up, reﬂ  ecting the heightened risk aversion 
that prevailed in ﬁ  nancial markets.
Policy Actions and the Market Response
To strengthen conﬁ  dence in the U.S. ﬁ  nancial system, 
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11. Gross issuance of selected mortgage- and asset-backed  
securities, 2003–08  
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ing in concert with foreign central banks, expanded its 
existing liquidity facilities and announced several addi-
tional initiatives, including programs to support short-
term funding markets and to purchase agency debt 
obligations and MBS. (These initiatives are discussed 
in more detail in the appendix.) Because of the sharply 
diminished availability of market funding, several Fed-
eral Reserve facilities were used heavily throughout the 
remainder of the year.
  In addition, the Treasury announced a temporary 
guarantee program for money market mutual funds and 
proposed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to 
use government funds to help stabilize the ﬁ  nancial sys-
tem; on October 3, the Congress approved and provided 
funding for this program as part of the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act. Using funds from the TARP, 
the Treasury established a voluntary capital purchase 
plan under which the U.S. government would buy pre-
ferred shares from eligible institutions. Additionally, 
under the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 
(TLGP), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) provided a temporary guarantee for selected 
senior unsecured obligations of participating insured 
depository institutions and many of their parent holding 
companies as well as for all balances in non-interest-
bearing transaction deposit accounts at participating 
insured depository institutions.
  After these actions and the announcements of similar 
programs in a number of other countries, stresses in 
ﬁ  nancial markets eased somewhat, though conditions 
remained strained. In the interbank funding market, 
Libor ﬁ  xings at most maturities declined noticeably 
and spreads over comparable-maturity OIS rates nar-
rowed. Meanwhile, spreads on highly rated unsecured 
commercial paper and ABCP narrowed after the Federal 
Reserve announced measures in support of this market, 
and issuance rebounded somewhat from its lows in 
September and October. Conditions in global short-term 
dollar funding markets also improved signiﬁ  cantly after 
the Federal Reserve substantially expanded its program 
of liquidity swaps with foreign central banks, which 
increased the amount of dollar funding auctioned in 
foreign markets, and a number of foreign governments 
took measures to strengthen and stabilize their banking 
systems. 
  Despite these improvements, investors remained 
concerned about the soundness of ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions. Spreads on CDS for U.S. banks widened further 
in November, which raised the prospect of signiﬁ  cant 
increases in banks’ costs of raising the funds they 
needed for lending. Citigroup, in particular, saw its 
CDS spread widen dramatically after it announced that 
it would take large losses on its securities portfolio. 
To support market stability, the U.S. government on 
November 23 entered into an agreement with Citigroup 
to provide a package of capital, guarantees, and liquid-
ity access. Subsequently, CDS spreads for ﬁ  nancial 
institutions reversed a portion of their earlier widening, 
and some nonﬁ  nancial risk spreads also narrowed.
  Conditions in debt markets continued to ease after 
the passing of year-end, although most of these mar-
kets remain much less liquid than normal. Yields and 
spreads on corporate bonds and commercial paper have 
decreased noticeably in recent weeks, but activity in 
the leveraged loan market continues to be very weak. 
Equity prices for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms have continued to 
trend downward, and CDS spreads for such ﬁ  rms have 
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expressed renewed concern over ﬁ  nancial institutions in 
January after a number of ﬁ  rms, most notably Bank of 
America Corporation, reported large net losses for the 
fourth quarter. The Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal 
Reserve announced on January 16 that they had entered 
into an agreement with Bank of America to provide a 
package of capital, guarantees, and liquidity access (see 
the appendix). Although markets responded favorably 
to this action, the uncertain prospects of the ﬁ  nancial 
sector continue to weigh heavily on market sentiment.
Banking Institutions and the 
Availability of Credit
Commercial bank credit grew moderately over 2008 
as a whole as both businesses and households at times 
drew heavily on existing lending commitments, but it 
contracted noticeably toward the end of the year and in 
early 2009. In the face of the severe ﬁ  nancial market 
disruptions, some companies turned to already com-
mitted lines of credit with banks, which caused the 
growth of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to 
spike in September and October. However, C&I lending 
declined over the past few months as some businesses 
reportedly paid down outstanding loans and stepped up 
their issuance in the corporate bond market. In addition, 
banks continued to report decreased demand for credit 
late last year in response to slowing business invest-
ment and reduced merger and acquisition activity. Most 
banks continued to tighten standards and terms on C&I 
loans to ﬁ  rms of all sizes. Issuance of leveraged loans 
by banks, which had already been very low through the 
ﬁ  rst half of last year, was essentially nil in the second 
half, largely because of a drop in mergers and leveraged 
buyouts, which these loans are often used to ﬁ  nance. 
Commercial real estate (CRE) loans on banks’ books 
expanded over 2008 as a whole. However, with the 
commercial mortgage securitization market essentially 
closed by mid-year, the rate of growth of this loan cat-
egory stepped down signiﬁ  cantly in the second half—a 
decrease consistent with the reported tightening of stan-
dards and a drop-off in demand for these loans.
  Bank loans to households also declined over the 
second half of 2008 and early 2009, led by a sharp con-
traction in residential mortgage loans on banks’ books, 
as demand weakened further and banks sold such loans 
to the GSEs. However, loans drawn under existing 
revolving home equity lines of credit continued to rise 
briskly during the second half of the year, an increase 
likely inﬂ  uenced by a drop in the prime rate, on which 
the rates on such loans are often based. Growth of con-
sumer loans originated by banks expanded at a solid 
pace through October but weakened considerably in 
November and December. However, the amount of 
such loans held on banks’ books generally continued to 
expand late in the year, as banks had difﬁ  culty selling 
these loans because of ongoing disruptions in securi-
tization markets. Recently, consumer loan growth has 
also reportedly been buoyed by banks’ decisions to 
build inventory in anticipation of issuance into the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).
  In the Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices conducted in both October 2008 and 
January 2009, very large net fractions of banks reported 
having tightened lending standards for all major loan 
types. Signiﬁ  cant net fractions of respondents also 
reported a widespread weakening of loan demand. In 
line with the nearly 33 percent drop (annual rate) in 
total unused loan commitments reported in fourth-
quarter Call Reports, many banks indicated in the Janu-
ary survey that they had cut the size of existing credit 
lines to businesses and households (ﬁ  gure 14).
  Earnings growth at depository institutions slowed 
markedly in 2008, and proﬁ  tability as measured by 
return on assets and return on equity dropped dramati-
cally (ﬁ  gure 15); indeed, commercial banks posted an 
aggregate loss in the fourth quarter. These develop-
ments in part reﬂ  ected write-downs on securities hold-
ings and increases in loan-loss provisioning in response 
to deteriorating asset quality. In the fourth quarter, the 
overall loan delinquency rate at commercial banks 
increased to more than 4½ percent, its highest level 
since the early 1990s, and the total charge-off rate rose 
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14. Change in unused bank loan commitments to  
businesses and households, 1990:Q2–2008:Q4  
NOTE: The data, which are not seasonally adjusted, are quarterly and
extend through 2008:Q4. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report). 12  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009
previous two recessions. The ratio of loan-loss reserves 
to net charge-offs—an indicator of reserve adequacy—
dropped below its previous nadir reached in the early 
1990s.
  Depository institutions’ access to funding has 
improved as a result of the various Federal Reserve 
liquidity programs and the TLGP, under which eligible 
ﬁ  rms have issued $169 billion of FDIC-guaranteed 
bonds to date. In addition, the capital of banking organ- 
izations has been boosted by more than $200 billion 
of preferred stock purchases under the TARP. Still, the 
recent downward trend in the equity prices of most 
banks and the elevated level of their CDS spreads sug-
gest that market participants remain concerned about 
the long-term proﬁ  tability and potential insolvency of 
some depository institutions.
 The  ﬁ  nancial turmoil has led to signiﬁ  cant changes 
in the structure of the broad banking industry, with two 
large investment banks and one large ﬁ  nance company 
recently converting to bank holding companies to 
obtain better access to government funding programs; 
a handful of large insurance ﬁ  rms, motivated partly by 
their desire to apply for TARP funding, have likewise 
converted to thrift holding companies. In addition, sev-
eral failures and mergers of large ﬁ  nancial institutions 
resulted in increased concentrations of industry assets 
and deposits in 2008.
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
In part reﬂ  ecting the intensifying deterioration in ﬁ  nan-
cial conditions, nearly all major sectors of the U.S. 
economy recorded sizable declines in activity in late 
2008, and the weakness has extended into early 2009. 
Conditions in the labor market have worsened sub-
stantially since early autumn as employment has fallen 
rapidly, the unemployment rate has climbed, and ﬁ  rms 
continue to announce more layoffs. Housing remains on 
a steep downward trend, and both consumer spending 
and business investment have contracted signiﬁ  cantly. 
In addition, demand for U.S. exports has slumped in 
response to the decline in foreign economic activity. 
Meanwhile, overall consumer price inﬂ  ation turned 
negative in late 2008 as energy prices tumbled, and core 
inﬂ  ation slowed noticeably.
The Labor Market
Conditions in the labor market deteriorated throughout 
2008, but they worsened markedly in the autumn as job 
losses accelerated and the unemployment rate jumped. 
In total, private payrolls fell 3¾ million between the 
onset of the recession in December 2007 and Janu-
ary 2009, with roughly half of the reduction occurring 
during the past three months (ﬁ  gure 16). Indeed, since 
November, private payroll employment has fallen 
600,000 per month, compared with average monthly 
job losses of 340,000 in September and October and 
160,000 over the ﬁ  rst eight months of 2008. The civil-
ian unemployment rate, which stood at 4.9 percent in 
December 2007, has marched steadily upward over the 
past year, and it reached 7.6 percent in January 2009, its 
highest level since 1992 (ﬁ  gure 17). Moreover, private 
surveys and news reports indicate that ﬁ  rms plan on 
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16. Net change in private payroll employment, 2002–09  
NOTE: Nonfarm business sector. The data are monthly and extend through
January 2009. 
SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  13
  Virtually all major industries have experienced con-
siderable job losses recently. Manufacturing employ-
ment has fallen nearly 500,000 over the past three 
months and has dropped more than 1 million since 
December 2007. Layoffs in truck transportation and 
wholesale trade, which are closely related to activity in 
the manufacturing sector, show a similar pattern. The 
decline in construction employment, which began in 
early 2007, has also sped up, in part because the ongo-
ing contraction in homebuilding has been accompanied 
more recently by weakness in nonresidential building. 
In the service-producing sector, job losses have mount-
ed at retail establishments, providers of ﬁ  nancial servic-
es, and professional and business services ﬁ  rms, all of 
which have been adversely affected by the downturn in 
economic activity. A noticeable exception has been the 
continued brisk hiring by providers of health services. 
  The increase in joblessness has been widespread 
across demographic, educational, and occupational 
groups. In January 2009, the unemployment rate for 
men aged 25 years and older was 3 percentage points 
above its average level in the fourth quarter of 2007, 
while the rate for women aged 25 years and older was 
up 2 percentage points; as typically occurs during reces-
sions, unemployment rates for teenagers and young 
adults showed even larger increases. Among the major 
racial and ethnic groups, unemployment rates for blacks 
and Hispanics have risen somewhat more than those 
for whites, a differential also typical of periods when 
labor market conditions weaken. Moreover, the number 
of workers who are working part time for economic 
reasons—a group that includes individuals whose hours 
have been cut back by their employers as well as those 
who want full-time jobs but are unable to ﬁ  nd them—
has soared to nearly 8 million, more than 3 million 
above its level at the start of the recession. The increase 
in involuntary part-time work has been widespread 
across industries.
  The labor force participation rate, which typically 
falls during periods of labor market weakness, has 
decreased of late (ﬁ  gure 18). The decline has probably 
been damped somewhat by the availability of extended 
unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts, which may have 
encouraged some workers who would have otherwise 
discontinued their job search efforts to continue look-
ing for work.4 In addition, the reduction in house-
hold wealth over the past couple of years may have 
prompted some individuals who would have otherwise 
dropped out of the labor force to remain in, and it may 
have caused some who would not have entered the 
labor force to do so.
  Broad measures of nominal hourly compensation, 
which includes both wages and beneﬁ  ts, posted moder-
ate increases in 2008. For example, compensation per 
hour in the nonfarm business sector—a measure derived 
from the compensation data in the national income and 
product accounts (NIPA)—rose 3½ percent in nominal 
terms in 2008, similar to the increases over the preced-
ing few years (ﬁ  gure 19).
4.  Under legislation enacted in June 2008, the Emergency Unem-
ployment Compensation (EUC) program began to provide an addi-
tional 13 weeks of beneﬁ  ts to workers who exhaust their regular ben-
eﬁ  ts (typically 26 weeks). In November, the program was expanded 
to provide additional beneﬁ  ts to workers who exhaust the previously 
available 13 weeks of EUC beneﬁ  ts (an additional 7 weeks for all 
eligible individuals and a further 13 weeks for individuals in states 
with high unemployment rates—deﬁ  ned as a state unemployment rate 
of 6 percent or above). This expansion, as well as the original EUC 
program, was scheduled to expire in March 2009, but the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended it through Decem-
ber 2009; the act also increased payments to recipients of unemploy-
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  The wage component of hourly compensation also 
rose moderately in nominal terms in 2008, and because 
consumer price inﬂ  ation over the year as a whole was 
low, much of the gain in nominal wages was reﬂ  ected 
in higher real wages. For example, over the four quar-
ters of last year, average hourly earnings, a measure of 
hourly wages for production and nonsupervisory work-
ers, increased nearly 4 percent in nominal terms—and 
rose 2 percent after accounting for the rise in the price 
index for overall personal consumption expenditures 
(PCE). However, because of sharp cutbacks in hours 
worked, real average weekly earnings were up just 
1 percent. Moreover, for many workers, real weekly 
earnings actually declined: In manufacturing, real aver-
age weekly earnings fell 1 percent last year, while in 
retail trade, this measure of real weekly earnings fell 
more than 2 percent. 
The Household Sector
Residential Investment and Housing Finance
Housing activity remained on a steep downward trend 
in the second half of 2008. Home sales and prices 
slumped further, and homebuilders continued to cur-
tail new construction in response to weak demand and 
elevated backlogs of unsold new homes. In the single-
family sector, new units were started at an average 
annual rate of just 460,000 units in the fourth quarter 
of 2008—roughly 75 percent below the quarterly high 
reached in mid-2005 (ﬁ  gure 20). Starts in the multi-
family sector averaged just 200,000 units in the fourth 
quarter; for 2008 as a whole, multifamily starts totaled 
285,000, the lowest level in more than a decade. In all, 
the decline in residential investment, as measured in the 
NIPA, subtracted ¾ percentage point from the annual 
rate of change in GDP in the second half of 2008, about 
as much as in the ﬁ  rst half. The further drop in housing 
starts and residential building permits in January sug-
gests that housing will continue to exert a substantial 
drag on the change in real GDP in early 2009.
  The further contraction in housing demand in the 
second half of 2008 partly reﬂ  ected the bleaker picture 
for household income and wealth. Potential homebuy-
ers may also have been deterred by concerns about the 
likelihood of additional declines in house prices and 
fears of buying into a falling market. And while individ-
uals who qualiﬁ  ed for ﬁ  xed-rate conforming mortgages 
were able to take advantage of historically low interest 
rates, many potential homebuyers with blemished credit 
histories or who were in a position to make only small 
down payments found it difﬁ  cult to obtain loans. In the 
market for new single-family homes, sales fell nearly 
30 percent (not at an annual rate) between the second 
and fourth quarters, which brought the total decline in 
sales since their peak in mid-2005 to 70 percent. The 
slippage in sales has continued to hamper builders’ 
efforts to gain control of their inventories. Although 
the stock of unsold new homes fell considerably in the 
second half of 2008, it did not fall as much as sales; 
thus, the months’ supply of unsold new homes con-
tinued to move up, reaching a level nearly three times 
that recorded during the ﬁ  rst half of the decade. In the 
market for existing single-family homes, the decline 
in sales in recent quarters has been less pronounced 
than for new homes, but this situation could reﬂ  ect the 
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involving foreclosed homes and other distressed prop-
erties, which tend to sell at heavily discounted prices. 
Existing home sales ended the year more than 30 per-
cent below the highs of a few years earlier. 
  House prices fell sharply in the second half of 2008, 
with the latest 12-month readings in major nation-
wide indexes showing prices of existing homes down 
between 9 percent and 19 percent (ﬁ  gure 21). One such 
measure, the LoanPerformance repeat-sales price index, 
fell 11 percent over the 12 months ending in Decem-
ber and stood 19 percent below its peak in early 2006. 
Declines in home prices have been especially steep in 
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. These states, 
which had experienced some of the largest increases in 
home prices earlier in the decade, have generally seen 
the largest increases in delinquency rates and foreclo-
sure actions initiated by lenders.  
  The drop in home prices is contributing to worsen-
ing payment problems among mortgage borrowers. 
Traditionally, some homeowners have coped with job 
loss and other life events by reﬁ  nancing their homes 
and extracting equity or by selling the properties. 
However, the considerable declines in housing equity, 
along with tighter lending standards, mean that even 
prime loans are more difﬁ  cult to reﬁ  nance, and weak 
housing demand has made selling difﬁ  cult. As a con-
sequence, borrowers have increasingly fallen behind 
in their monthly obligations. Indeed, in November 
2008, 25 percent of subprime mortgages were seriously 
delinquent (the latest available data).5  As of December 
2008, 3¾ percent of prime mortgages were seriously 
delinquent—much lower than the level of serious delin-
quency for nonprime loans, but still almost twice the 
level of a year earlier (ﬁ  gure 22).
  Foreclosures also have risen appreciably of late. 
Indeed, available data suggest that more than 2 million 
homes entered the foreclosure process in 2008, com-
pared with foreclosure starts of 1½ million in 2007 and 
1 million or less in each of the preceding four years. As 
with delinquencies, declining house prices have been a 
key contributor to the rise in foreclosures. At the same 
time, rising foreclosures have exacerbated the decline 
in house prices by increasing the number of heavily 
discounted properties on the market and thus exerting 
downward pressure on prices of otherwise comparable 
occupied homes. Lenders and public policy makers 
have taken steps to limit the number of avoidable fore-
closures by modifying mortgages and putting in place 
programs such as Hope for Homeowners, established 
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
  In an environment of generally weak housing 
demand, falling home prices, tighter lending standards, 
and rising foreclosures, total household mortgage debt 
appears to have posted an outright decline in 2008—the 
ﬁ  rst in the history of the series, which extends back to 
5. A mortgage is deﬁ  ned as seriously delinquent if the borrower is 
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the 1950s. In secondary mortgage markets, securitiza-
tion of mortgages by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
has fallen in recent months, and gross issuance of 
GSE-backed MBS has lately just outpaced maturing 
issues so that levels outstanding have only inched up 
since the summer. Issuance of Ginnie Mae securities 
backed by FHA loans has continued to be strong, but 
the non-agency MBS market remains closed. The FHA 
has offered an alternative source of mortgage ﬁ  nanc-
ing for some nonprime and near-prime borrowers, and 
such lending has picked up lately; still, it has replaced 
only part of the reduction in credit from other sources, 
largely because of the FHA’s relatively strict lending 
standards and higher costs.
  Interest rates on 30-year ﬁ  xed-rate conforming 
mortgages have fallen about 100 basis points, on net, 
since the November 25 announcement of the Federal 
Reserve’s program to purchase MBS issued by the 
housing GSEs and Ginnie Mae, and they currently stand 
at 5 percent (ﬁ  gure 23). However, interest rates for 
nonconforming jumbo ﬁ  xed-rate loans have declined 
by less than those for conforming mortgages in recent 
months, which has caused the extraordinarily wide 
spread between the two rates to widen further.6 The 
high level of this spread reﬂ  ects, in part, the absence of 
functioning securitization markets for jumbo mortgages 
as well as an increased aversion by banks to making 
potentially risky loans.
Consumer Spending and Household Finance
Consumer spending held up reasonably well in the ﬁ  rst 
part of 2008. However, spending slackened noticeably 
toward the end of the second quarter despite the boost 
to household income from the tax rebates authorized by 
the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, and consumer out-
lays entered the second half of the year on a downward 
trajectory. Against a backdrop of sizable job losses, 
decreases in household net worth, and difﬁ  culties in 
obtaining credit, real PCE declined at an annual rate 
of more than 3½ percent in the second half of 2008 
(ﬁ  gure 24).
  The downshift in consumer spending reﬂ  ected both 
a sharp pullback in purchases of goods and a marked 
deceleration in expenditures on services. Outlays for 
new light motor vehicles (cars, sport utility vehicles, 
and pickup trucks) were especially hard hit. Indeed, at 
an annual rate of just 10¼ million units, sales of light 
vehicles in the fourth quarter were nearly 4 million 
units below the already reduced pace during the ﬁ  rst 
nine months of the year; they fell further in January 
2009 despite relatively low gasoline prices and a sub-
stantial increase in sales incentives in recent months.
  Real disposable personal income (DPI)—that is, 
after-tax income adjusted for inﬂ  ation—rose just 
1¼ percent in 2008. Some of the weakness in real DPI 
reﬂ  ected softness in aggregate wage and salary income, 
which fell slightly in real terms. As noted earlier, hourly 
wages posted a solid increase in real terms last year, 
but the effect of this increase on aggregate wages and 
6.  Conforming mortgages are those eligible for purchase by Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac; they must be equivalent in risk to a prime 
mortgage with an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio, and they cannot 
exceed the conforming loan limit. The conforming loan limit for 
a ﬁ  rst mortgage on a single-family home in the contiguous United 
States is currently equal to the greater of $417,000 or 115 percent 
of an area’s median house price; it cannot exceed $625,500. Jumbo 
mortgages are those that exceed the maximum size of a conforming 
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salaries was outweighed by the negative effects of the 
contraction in employment and the decrease in hours 
worked by those who retained jobs. Apart from transfer 
payments, most types of nonwage income performed 
poorly as well. Measured on a per capita basis, average 
real after-tax income was essentially unchanged last 
year, compared with an average increase of nearly 
2 percent during the preceding ﬁ  ve years. 
  In addition to the weakness in income, consumer 
spending has been restrained in recent quarters by a 
sizable decrease in household net worth (ﬁ  gure 25). 
This source of restraint on spending likely reﬂ  ects not 
only the most recent drops in equity and house prices 
but also the lagged effects of the appreciable decline in 
wealth during 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008. The loss 
of wealth, along with heightened concerns about the 
prospects for jobs and income, helped push consumer 
sentiment to very low levels (ﬁ  gure 26). These factors 
also contributed to a noticeable upturn in the personal 
saving rate, which rose to nearly 3 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 after ﬂ  uctuating between 0 and 1 per-
cent for most of the period since 2005 (ﬁ  gure 27).
   Nonmortgage consumer debt outstanding appears 
to have fallen, on net, in the second half of 2008 after 
having increased at an annual rate of 4 percent in the 
ﬁ  rst half. Part of the drop in borrowing was likely due 
to weaker demand for loans, but the available evidence 
also suggests that lenders tightened the supply signiﬁ  -
cantly. Indeed, results from the Senior Loan Ofﬁ  cer 
Opinion Survey released in October 2008 and January 
2009 revealed that many banks tightened standards and 
terms for consumer loans, actions that included lower-
ing credit limits on existing credit card accounts. Lend-
ers also reportedly continued to tighten underwriting 
standards on non-government-guaranteed student loans, 
and some major providers of these loans exited the 
market.
  Part of the tightening of lending standards and terms 
no doubt reﬂ  ects lenders’ concerns about the credit 
quality of households. Indeed, the performance of con-
sumer loans has continued to worsen in recent months, 
albeit less starkly than that of mortgages. Delinquency 
rates for most types of consumer lending—credit cards, 
auto loans, and nonrevolving loans—rose signiﬁ  cantly, 
on net, over the course of 2008, and most such rates 
now stand at or above the levels seen during the 2001 
recession (ﬁ  gure 28). Household bankruptcy rates also 
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  The pullback in consumer credit also likely reﬂ  ects, 
in part, the difﬁ  culties in the market for asset-backed 
securities. Until the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, a substantial frac-
tion of consumer credit had been funded with ABS, but 
since the third quarter, issuance of credit card, automo-
bile, and student loan ABS has slowed to a trickle. As 
noted earlier, to facilitate renewed issuance of consumer 
and small business ABS and thus support economic 
activity, the Federal Reserve announced in November 
plans for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facil-
ity, which will begin operations in the coming weeks.7 
Spreads on AAA-rated ABS rose through most of last 
year but have declined lately, reportedly in anticipation 
of the opening of the TALF.
  Against this backdrop, interest rates on auto loans 
generally rose somewhat during the second half of 
2008, and those on most other types of consumer loans 
were little changed, despite a substantial decrease 
in rates on comparable-maturity Treasury securities. 
Although some consumer interest rates appear to have 
fallen slightly in early 2009, their spreads to Treasury 
rates remain quite elevated.
The Business Sector
Fixed Investment
After having posted small gains in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, 
real business ﬁ  xed investment edged down in the third 
quarter and fell sharply in the fourth quarter (ﬁ  gure 29). 
The retrenchment in investment reﬂ  ected both a steep 
drop in outlays on equipment and software (E&S) and 
a sharp deceleration in spending on nonresidential 
construction after 2½ years of robust gains. Investment 
demand appears to have been depressed by the down-
turn in sales, production, and proﬁ  tability as well as by 
the reduced availability and higher cost of credit from 
securities markets, banks, and other lenders.
  Real spending for E&S fell at annual rates of 
7½ percent in the third quarter and 28 percent in the 
fourth quarter. Business outlays on motor vehicles, 
which had fallen sharply in the ﬁ  rst half of the year, 
continued to plunge in the second half. Outlays for 
other major components of E&S also recorded sizable 
declines. Real investment in information technology 
equipment—which had risen moderately in the ﬁ  rst 
half of the year—fell at a 12½ percent annual rate, on 
average, in the second half as business demand for 
computers, software, and communications equipment 
dropped appreciably. Real spending on equipment other 
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28. Delinquency rates on consumer loans, 1996–2008  
Credit cards
NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2008:Q4. Delinquency
rate is the percent of loans 30 days or more past due. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report). 
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NOTE: High-tech equipment consists of computers and peripheral equip-
ment and communications equipment. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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had been moving essentially sideways since the end 
of 2005, held up through the third quarter. However, it 
fell at an annual rate of about 20 percent in the fourth 
quarter, and the slow pace of orders lately, along with 
the downbeat tone in recent surveys of business condi-
tions, points to further declines in this broad category of 
spending in early 2009.
  On net, real outlays for nonresidential construction 
posted a small increase in the second half of 2008. 
However, gains were concentrated in energy-related 
sectors—drilling and mining structures, petroleum 
reﬁ  neries, and transmission and distribution facilities—
and likely reﬂ  ected the earlier run-up in the price of 
crude oil. Outside the energy-related sectors, spending 
turned down in the second half of last year as construc-
tion of ofﬁ  ce buildings softened and spending on non-
ofﬁ  ce commercial buildings (a category that includes 
retail, wholesale, and some warehouse space) fell 
sharply. The decline was related to the rise in vacancy 
rates over the past few quarters, which was driven, 
in part, by the weakening in aggregate output and 
employment. In addition, recent reports from bank 
lending ofﬁ  cers suggest that ﬁ  nancing for new 
construction projects has become even more difﬁ  cult to 
obtain.
Inventory Investment
One hallmark of the economic landscape over the past 
year has been the prompt response of producers to the 
slowing in ﬁ  nal sales. For much of 2008, the production 
adjustments resulted in a rapid pace of inventory liqui-
dation and were sufﬁ  cient to prevent the emergence of 
widespread stock imbalances (ﬁ  gure 30). In the fourth 
quarter, however, the precipitous drop in ﬁ  nal demand 
left many ﬁ  rms holding inventories in excess of desired 
levels—a view expressed by respondents to a variety 
of business surveys at the turn of the year. Accordingly, 
available data suggest that producers continued to pare 
back output in January 2009.
  The inventory overhang at year-end was especially 
acute in the motor vehicle sector. Although automakers 
slashed production during the fourth quarter, the col-
lapse in sales last autumn pushed up dealers’ stocks, and 
the days’ supply of cars and light trucks soared to near-
ly 100 days—well above industry norms. In response, 
motor vehicle manufacturers instituted even larger cuts 
in production in early 2009. These cuts should help ease 
the pressure on dealers’ stocks, though further progress 
will require continued restraint on production, a mean-
ingful pickup in sales, or both.
Corporate Proﬁ  ts and Business Finance
Operating earnings per share for S&P 500 ﬁ  rms fell an 
estimated 17 percent in 2008. Losses were especially 
pronounced for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. In the nonﬁ  nancial sec-
tor, earnings at ﬁ  rms other than oil and gas companies 
generally slowed over the course of 2008 and declined 
outright in the fourth quarter. In addition, in light of 
the deterioration in the economy, analysts signiﬁ  cantly 
marked down their projections for earnings in 2009.
  Borrowing by domestic nonﬁ  nancial businesses—
primarily through the corporate bond market, the 
commercial paper market, and bank loans—slowed 
markedly in the second half of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 31). The 
deceleration reﬂ  ected not only a reduced desire of 
businesses to borrow and invest in response to the 
worsening economic outlook but also a reduced will-
ingness of potential lenders to provide funding for risky 
projects. In the corporate bond market, issuance of 
investment-grade securities by nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms was 
solid throughout the year; in contrast, speculative-grade 
issuance has been scant in recent months. After moving 
up in the ﬁ  rst half of the year, the cost of longer-term 
ﬁ  nancing rose further as interest rates on both invest-
ment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds soared 
in the fall. While corporate bond rates were climbing, 
Treasury yields dropped, pushing interest rate spreads 
on corporate bonds well above previous record highs. 
The increases in spreads appeared to derive from both 
the anticipation of an increase in defaults and a further 
reduction in investors’ willingness to take risk. In the 
commercial paper market, short-term borrowing by 
highly rated nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms has increased since 
the summer; the rise reﬂ  ects importantly the Federal 
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ﬁ  rms. Indeed, rates on highly rated paper with maturi-
ties of less than 30 days have averaged around 20 basis 
points since late November, compared with nearly 
200 basis points in September and October. Rates on 
lower-grade nonﬁ  nancial paper have also decreased in 
recent months, but their spreads to highly rated paper 
remain elevated by historical standards.
  Bank lending to businesses expanded in September 
and October as ﬁ  rms reportedly drew on existing lines 
of credit. More recently, however, loans to commercial 
and industrial borrowers have registered signiﬁ  cant 
declines. In addition, the growth of commercial real 
estate loans—which are often used to ﬁ  nance construc-
tion and land development—slowed substantially in 
the second half of the year. Given the deteriorating eco-
nomic outlook, tighter credit standards, and businesses’ 
decisions to scale back new investment, both C&I and 
CRE lending seem likely to fall further in the ﬁ  rst part 
of 2009 (ﬁ  gure 32).
  In the equity market, initial offerings by nonﬁ  nancial 
corporations were very sparse through the second half 
of 2008, and seasoned offerings (excluding ﬁ  rms in 
the energy sector) were also weak (ﬁ  gure 33). Equity 
retirements—which often occur as a result of share 
repurchases that are associated with cash-ﬁ  nanced 
mergers—continued to outpace the combined amount 
of private and public issuance, a development due, in 
part, to the completion of a few large mergers. How-
ever, share repurchases are estimated to have moderated 
a bit in recent months, and announcements of future 
cash-ﬁ  nanced mergers have slowed signiﬁ  cantly, likely 
because of the weaker economic outlook and tighter 
lending conditions.
  The credit quality of nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms deteriorated 
in the second half of the year. The aggregate ratio of 
debt to assets climbed further, and the aggregate ratio 
of liquid assets to total assets declined notably. Ratings 
downgrades on nonﬁ  nancial corporate bonds picked 
up and outpaced upgrades, and the share of corporate 
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NOTE: Net equity issuance is the difference between equity issued by
domestic companies in public or private markets and equity retired through
share repurchases, domestic cash-financed mergers, or foreign takeovers of
U.S. firms. Equity issuance includes funds invested by private equity
partnerships and stock option proceeds. 
SOURCE: Thomson Financial, Investment Benchmark Report; Money Tree
Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, National Venture Capital Association,
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32. Net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards  
and increasing spreads on commercial and industrial  
loans to large and medium-sized borrowers, 1993–2009 
Spreads
NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey generally conducted four times
per year; the last observation is from the January 2009 survey, which covers
2008:Q4. Net percentage is the percentage of banks reporting a tightening of
standards or an increase in spreads less the percentage reporting an easing or
a decrease. Spreads are measured as the loan rate less the bank’s cost of
funds. The definition for firm size suggested for, and generally used by,
survey respondents is that large and medium-sized firms have annual sales of
$50 million or more. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on
Bank Lending Practices. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  21
6½ percent. Delinquency rates on C&I loans increased 
noticeably in the fourth quarter, and delinquency rates 
on CRE loans rose further, mainly because of continued 
rapid weakening in the performance of residential and 
commercial construction loans (ﬁ  gure 34).
The Government Sector
Federal Government
The deﬁ  cit in the federal uniﬁ  ed budget is in the midst 
of a massive widening. Mainly reﬂ  ecting the decelera-
tion in economic activity and the provisions of the Eco-
nomic Stimulus Act of 2008, the deﬁ  cit rose to 
$455 billion in ﬁ  scal year 2008, nearly $300 billion 
higher than in ﬁ  scal 2007 and equal to more than 
3 percent of nominal GDP. So far in ﬁ  scal 2009, the 
deﬁ  cit has increased substantially further, mostly 
because of outlays under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program and the effects of the weak economy on rev-
enues and spending.8 In January, the Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ  ce estimated that the deﬁ  cit for ﬁ  scal 2009 
as a whole would total more than $1 trillion under the 
spending and taxation policies in place at that time, a 
ﬁ  gure that excludes the budgetary impact of the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
  Federal receipts fell nearly 2 percent in nominal 
terms in ﬁ  scal 2008 and stood at 17¾ percent of nomi-
nal GDP; they dropped further during the ﬁ  rst four 
months of ﬁ  scal 2009 (ﬁ  gure 35). The decline has 
been most pronounced in corporate receipts, which 
have fallen at double-digit rates as corporate proﬁ  ts 
have dropped and as ﬁ  rms have presumably adjusted 
payments to take advantage of the bonus depreciation 
provisions contained in the Economic Stimulus Act. 
Excluding the rebates provided to most households 
under the act, individual income tax receipts rose mod-
erately in ﬁ  scal 2008. However, so far in ﬁ  scal 2009, 
individual receipts have been running below year-
earlier levels, likely because of the weakness in nominal 
personal income and reduced capital gains realizations.
 Excluding  ﬁ  nancial transactions, nominal federal 
outlays increased 8 percent in ﬁ  scal 2008 after having 
risen just 3 percent in ﬁ  scal 2007. Defense outlays rose 

























2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991
CMBS
NOTE: The data for commercial banks and life insurance companies are
quarterly and extend through 2008:Q4. The data for commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are monthly and extend through January
2009. The delinquency rates for commercial banks and CMBS are the percent
of loans 30 days or more past due or not accruing interest. The delinquency
rate for life insurance companies is the percent of loans 60 days or more past
due or not accruing interest. 
SOURCE: For commercial banks, Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call
Report); for life insurance companies, American Council of Life Insurers; for
CMBS, Citigroup. 
8.  In the Monthly Treasury Statements, equity purchases under the 
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35. Federal receipts and expenditures, 1988–2008  
Expenditures
excluding net interest
NOTE: The receipts and expenditures data are on a unified-budget basis and
are for fiscal years (October through September); gross domestic product
(GDP) is for the four quarters ending in Q3. 
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget. 
which means that the outlays are recorded as they occur; a ﬂ  ow of 
receipts will be recorded in future years to reﬂ  ect any dividends on 
the shares of equity and the proceeds from the eventual sale of the 
shares. In contrast, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO) treats 
these transactions on an accrual basis and thus records outlays as the 
net present value cost of the equity purchases, rather than the entire 
amount that is disbursed; under the CBO approach, there is no offset-
ting ﬂ  ow of receipts in future years. According to the Treasury, the 
uniﬁ  ed budget deﬁ  cit for the ﬁ  rst four months of ﬁ  scal 2009 totaled 
$569 billion; under the CBO approach, the year-to-date deﬁ  cit would 
be $361 billion.   22  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009
authority over the past three years continued to bolster 
spending; increases in defense funding in recent years 
have been substantial not only for operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan but also for activities not directly related 
to those conﬂ  icts. Federal spending also rose sharply in 
ﬁ  scal 2008 for programs that provide support to lower-
income households. So far in ﬁ  scal 2009, federal out-
lays for defense and low-income support programs have 
continued to rise rapidly. Also, spending for Medicare 
has picked up lately, and outlays for Social Security 
have been lifted by the large cost-of-living adjustment 
that took place in January. As for the part of federal 
spending that is a direct component of GDP, real federal 
expenditures for consumption and gross investment 
rose at an annual rate of 10 percent, on average, in the 
second half of calendar year 2008, mostly because of 
the sizable increase in defense spending (ﬁ  gure 36).
State and Local Government
Aggregate real expenditures on consumption and gross 
investment by state and local governments were little 
changed, on net, in the second half of 2008 after posting 
a small increase in the ﬁ  rst half. In part reﬂ  ecting the 
mounting pressures on the sector’s budgets, state and 
local employment has been about ﬂ  at since mid-2008, 
while real construction spending has essentially moved 
sideways.
 The  ﬁ  nancial positions of most states—with the 
exceptions of Arizona, California, Michigan, and a few 
others—were fairly solid at the end of ﬁ  scal year 2008.9 
However, so far in ﬁ  scal 2009, revenues have been 
running signiﬁ  cantly below expected levels because of 
the softness in personal and corporate incomes and the 
weakness in retail sales. States’ initial plans to address 
the widening budget gaps have included cuts in spend-
ing on education and other programs, hiring freezes and 
furloughs, and some tapping of rainy day funds; in com-
ing quarters, however, the dominant inﬂ  uence on state 
budgets will be the infusion of grants-in-aid under the 
2009 federal stimulus package, which will help cushion 
the effects of the economic downturn on states’ bud-
gets. At the local level, property tax receipts continued 
to be propped up in 2008 by the lagged effects of the 
dramatic increases in house prices over the ﬁ  rst half of 
the decade.10 Nevertheless, the sharp fall in house prices 
over the past two years is likely to put substantial down-
ward pressure on local revenues before long. Moreover, 
many state and local governments will need to set aside 
money in coming years to rebuild their employee pen-
sion funds after the losses experienced in 2008 and to 
fund their ongoing obligations to provide health care to 
their retired employees.
The External Sector
In contrast to the ﬁ  rst half of 2008—when robust 
exports provided some offset to the softness in domestic 
demand—the external sector provided little support to 
economic activity in the second half of the year. After 
decelerating in the third quarter, real exports declined 
sharply in the fourth quarter, as economic activity 
abroad contracted. Real imports, which had been declin-
ing earlier in 2008, also dropped considerably in the 
fourth quarter, dragged down by deteriorating U.S. 
demand (ﬁ  gure 37). The declines in trade ﬂ  ows in late 
2008 were widespread across major types of products 
and U.S. trading partners. In addition, exports were 
depressed by production disruptions at Boeing.
  The U.S. trade deﬁ  cit narrowed considerably at the 
end of 2008, which largely reﬂ  ected a sharp decline in 
the price of imported oil. The trade deﬁ  cit was $555 bil-
lion at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
or about 4 percent of nominal GDP, compared with 
a deﬁ  cit of 5 percent of nominal GDP a year earlier 
(ﬁ  gure 38).
10.  The lag between changes in house prices and changes in prop-
erty tax revenue likely occurs because many localities are subject to 
state limits on the annual increases in total property tax payments 
and property value assessments. Thus, increases in market prices for 
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  The price of crude oil in world markets was extreme-
ly volatile in 2008. After ending 2007 at about $95 per 
barrel, the spot price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) 
crude oil surged to more than $145 by mid-July amid 
both surprisingly robust oil demand, especially from 
emerging market economies, and continued restraint 
in near-term supply (ﬁ  gure 39). Since mid-July, the 
ﬁ  nancial market turmoil and the resulting sharp down-
turn in global economic activity have dragged down 
oil demand. Despite attempts by OPEC to rein in pro-
duction, the rapid drop in demand and concerns about 
future prospects for the global economy led to a col-
lapse in oil prices. The spot price of WTI fell about 
75 percent from its peak to near $40 per barrel in Janu-
ary of this year. Far-dated futures prices for crude oil 
have fallen somewhat less, which likely reﬂ  ects the 
view that OPEC actions will eventually reduce supply 
and that global oil demand will rebound in the medium 
term.
  Import prices rose rapidly in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, 
but the increase was reversed in the second half. That 
pattern primarily reﬂ  ected the sharp swing in oil prices, 
but it was also inﬂ  uenced by a marked slowing in non-
oil import price inﬂ  ation from its rapid pace in the ﬁ  rst 
half of the year. Even excluding oil, prices of imported 
goods declined in the fourth quarter of 2008, driven by 
both the sharp fall in non-oil commodity prices and the 
appreciation of the dollar that occurred in the latter half 
of the year. 
National Saving
Total net national saving—that is, the saving of house-
holds, businesses, and governments excluding depre-
ciation charges—fell further in 2008 (ﬁ  gure 40). After 
having ticked up to 3 percent of nominal GDP in 2006, 
net national saving dropped steadily over the subse-
quent two years as the federal budget deﬁ  cit widened, 
the ﬁ  scal positions of state and local governments dete-
riorated, and private saving remained low; in the third 
quarter of 2008, net national saving stood at negative 
1¾ percent of GDP. National saving will likely remain 
low this year in light of the weak economy and the 
recently enacted federal ﬁ  scal stimulus package. None-
theless, if not boosted over the longer run, persistent 
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SOURCE: For oil, the Commodity Research Bureau; for nonfuel
commodities, International Monetary Fund. 24  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009
with both low rates of capital formation and heavy bor-
rowing from abroad, which would limit the rise in the 
standard of living of U.S. residents over time and ham-
per the ability of the nation to meet the retirement needs 
of an aging population.
Prices and Labor Productivity
Prices
Although inﬂ  ation pressures were elevated during the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2008 and into the summer, they diminished 
appreciably toward year-end as prices of energy and 
other commodities dropped and the degree of slack 
in the economy increased. The chain-type price index 
for total personal consumption expenditures fell at an 
annual rate of 5½ percent in the fourth quarter after 
rising rapidly over the ﬁ  rst three quarters of the year. 
The core PCE price index—which excludes food and 
energy items—rose at an annual rate of just ½ percent 
in the fourth quarter after increases of 2¼ percent, on 
average, over the ﬁ  rst three quarters of the year. Over 
2008 as a whole, core PCE prices increased 1¾ percent 
(ﬁ  gure 41). Data for PCE prices in January 2009 are 
not yet available, but information from the consumer 
price index (CPI) and other sources suggests that both 
the total and core PCE price indexes posted modest 
increases in that month.
  Since peaking in July, consumer energy prices have 
fallen dramatically, with most of the decline coming 
during the last three months of 2008. Largely reﬂ  ect-
ing the drop in crude oil prices, the price of gasoline 
fell from around $4 per gallon, on average, in July to 
less than $2 per gallon in December; in mid-February, 
it was in the neighborhood of $2 per gallon. Prices of 
natural gas, which typically move roughly in line with 
crude oil prices over periods of several months, also fell 
sharply in the second half of 2008 after a substantial 
run-up in the ﬁ  rst half of the year. Consumer prices for 
electricity continued to move up through the end of the 
year—likely because of higher prices earlier in the year 
for fossil fuel inputs to electricity generation—though 
increases appear to have slowed in early 2009.
  In contrast, consumer food prices continued to rise 
rapidly into the autumn. Increases were substantial both 
for food consumed at home and for purchased meals 
and beverages, which typically are inﬂ  uenced more 
by labor and other business costs than by farm prices. 
Since November, however, increases in consumer food 
prices have been quite modest. Farm prices, which had 
soared between 2006 and mid-2008 as a consequence 
of strong world demand and the increased use of corn 
for the production of ethanol, fell sharply in the second 
half of last year as prospects for domestic and foreign 
demand for food weakened and the demand for ethanol 
eased. Typically, changes in farm prices start to show 
through fairly quickly to consumer food prices, and the 
small increases in the CPI for food in the past couple 
of months suggest that a noticeable moderation in con-
sumer food price inﬂ  ation is under way.
  The slowdown in core inﬂ  ation in late 2008 was 
widespread, although it was particularly steep for motor 
vehicles, apparel, and other consumer goods that were 
heavily discounted by retailers in an environment of 
weak demand and excess inventories. In addition, the 
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earlier in the year ebbed as pass-throughs of the previ-
ous large increases in the prices of energy and materials 
ran their course and the effects of recent declines in 
these prices started to show through to consumer prices. 
The strengthening in the exchange value of the dollar  
and the deceleration of import prices also helped ease 
the upward pressure on core inﬂ  ation.
  Survey-based measures of near-term inﬂ  ation expec-
tations have receded as actual inﬂ  ation has come down, 
while indicators of longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations 
have been steadier. According to the Reuters/University 
of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, median one-year 
inﬂ  ation expectations, which had moved above 5 per-
cent last spring and early summer, fell throughout the 
second half of last year; since December, they have 
ﬂ  uctuated around 2 percent. As for longer-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations, the Reuters/University of Michigan sur-
vey measure of median 5- to 10-year inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions was about 3 percent in January and early February 
of this year, similar to the readings during 2007 and the 
early part of 2008.
Productivity and Unit Labor Costs
Labor productivity has held up surprisingly well in 
the past year. Although productivity growth has often 
stalled during previous recessions, output per hour in 
the nonfarm business sector rose 2¾ percent over the 
course of 2008, the same rate as in 2007 (ﬁ  gure 42). 
The continued rise in productivity during the second 
half of last year, at a time when output was contracting, 
likely reﬂ  ects the aggressive downsizing undertaken 
by ﬁ  rms in response to their worsening sales prospects. 
Moreover, although estimates of the underlying pace of 
productivity growth are quite uncertain, the buoyancy 
of productivity in recent quarters suggests that the fun-
damental forces supporting a solid underlying trend—
for example, the rapid pace of technological change and 
the ongoing efforts by ﬁ  rms to use information tech-
nology to improve the efﬁ  ciency of their operations—
remain in place.
 Reﬂ  ecting the solid gain in labor productivity, along 
with the subdued increase in nominal hourly compensa-
tion noted earlier, unit labor costs in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector rose just ¾ percent in 2008. The increase in 
unit labor costs was about the same as that recorded in 
2007. 
Monetary Policy Expectations and 
Treasury Rates
The current target range for the federal funds rate, 0 to 
¼ percent, is substantially below the level that inves-
tors expected at the end of June 2008; policy expecta-
tions were steadily revised downward over the second 
half of the year as the ﬁ  nancial and economic outlook 
worsened. Toward the end of the year, readings on 
interest rate expectations from money market futures 
and options were complicated by persistent trading 
of federal funds below the target rate, which resulted 
from the large increase in reserve balances accompany-
ing the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity 
programs. Nevertheless, investors clearly anticipated 
that the federal funds rate would remain low for quite 
some time amid increasing concerns about the health 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions, weakness in the real economy, 
and a moderation in inﬂ  ation pressures. Futures quotes 
currently suggest that investors expect the federal funds 
rate to remain around its current level throughout the 
ﬁ  rst half of this year and then to rise gradually through 
the end of 2010. However, uncertainty about the size 
of term premiums and potential distortions created by 
the zero lower bound for the federal funds rate make it 
difﬁ  cult to obtain from futures prices a deﬁ  nitive read-
ing on the policy expectations of market participants. 
Options prices suggested that investor uncertainty about 
the future path for policy was increasing considerably 
through October, as strains in ﬁ  nancial markets inten-
siﬁ  ed, but these measures of uncertainty have subse-
quently trended downward.
  As the economic outlook worsened during the 
second half of the year and inﬂ  ation pressures ebbed, 
yields on longer-maturity Treasury securities declined 
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negative market sentiment and speculation that the Fed-
eral Reserve might begin purchasing large quantities of 
longer-maturity Treasury securities contributed at times 
to downward pressure on Treasury yields. Offsetting 
these factors to some degree were market expectations 
that the Treasury’s issuance of long-term debt, which 
rose notably over the course of 2008, would pick up 
further in 2009. On net, yields on 2- and 10-year notes 
fell about 200 and 140 basis points, respectively, during 
the second half of 2008.
  In contrast to yields on their nominal counterparts, 
yields on Treasury inﬂ  ation-protected securities (TIPS) 
rose over the second half of 2008, which resulted in 
a noticeable reduction in measured inﬂ  ation compen-
sation—the difference between comparable-maturity 
nominal and TIPS yields. Some of this reduction was 
reversed in the early part of 2009. Inferences about 
inﬂ  ation expectations based on TIPS yields have been 
difﬁ  cult to make recently because these yields appear to 
have been affected to a degree by movements in liquid-
ity premiums and because special factors have buffeted 
yields on nominal Treasury issues. 
Federal Borrowing
Federal debt soared in the second half of 2008. The 
more than $1 trillion of Treasury borrowing since the 
summer reﬂ  ects importantly the need to ﬁ  nance the 
Treasury’s purchases of agency MBS and equity; the 
TARP, under which the Treasury has purchased pre-
ferred shares in a number of ﬁ  nancial institutions; and 
the Supplementary Financing Program, under which the 
Treasury has increased deposits at the Federal Reserve 
to help fund the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s bal-
ance sheet. The ratio of federal debt held by the public 
to nominal GDP surged to almost 45 percent at the end 
of calendar year 2008 and seems certain to increase 
again in the ﬁ  rst part of 2009, as borrowing is expected 
to remain strong with the weak economy and budgetary 
initiatives.
  Despite the heavy issuance of Treasury securities in 
the second half of the year, the rapid growth of feder-
ally guaranteed debt issued by banking institutions 
under the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and 
continued issuance of GSE securities, demand at most 
Treasury auctions was solid, as investors sought the 
safety of Treasury securities. Demand for Treasury bills 
was extremely strong, and yields in secondary markets 
sometimes fell close to zero (and even below zero at 
times), even as the supply of bills increased markedly. 
Foreign custody holdings of Treasury securities at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York grew nearly 
40 percent over 2008, although the proportion of nomi-
nal coupon securities purchased at auctions by foreign 
investors generally remained in the 10 percent to 
30 percent range observed over the past several years.
State and Local Government Borrowing
On net, borrowing by state and local governments in 
the market for municipal securities was subdued in the 
second half of 2008. The issuance of short-term munici-
pal debt was robust, boosted in part by the need to fund 
operating expenditures at a time of weak revenues. 
However, issuance of long-term debt, which is gener-
ally used to fund capital spending projects or to refund 
existing long-term debt, slowed signiﬁ  cantly. Interest 
rates on long-term debt climbed sharply across the 
maturity spectrum in the second half of 2008 in the face 
of considerable strain on the budgets of many state and 
local governments and sharp deteriorations in market 
functioning. More recently, however, municipal bond 
rates have dropped markedly, in part because market 
participants appeared to view the federal stimulus pack-
age as likely to improve the ﬁ  nancial condition of state 
and local governments.
Monetary Aggregates
The M2 monetary aggregate increased at a 10 percent 
annual rate during the second half of 2008 and 
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The rapid growth reﬂ  ected in part a marked decrease 
in some market interest rates relative to the rates offered 
on M2 assets, as well as increased demand for safe and 
liquid assets during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil. During the 
second half of the year, the signiﬁ  cant slowdown in the 
growth of retail money market mutual funds was offset 
by a rapid increase in small time deposits, as banks bid 
aggressively for these deposits to buttress their fund-
ing. The currency component of the money stock also 
increased briskly, an indication of solid demand for 
U.S. banknotes from both foreign and domestic sources. 
Flows into demand deposits were signiﬁ  cant after the 
introduction of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Pro-
gram, which apparently drew funds out of other money 
market instruments.
  The monetary base—essentially the sum of cur-
rency in the hands of the public and bank reserves—has 
increased rapidly in recent months, primarily owing to 
heavy use of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs. 
Credit extended through these programs caused the 
balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to expand con-
siderably over the course of 2008, and this growth was 
ﬁ  nanced largely by the creation of reserve balances. The 
increase in reserve balances almost entirely represented 
an increase in excess reserves rather than an increase in 
required reserves. In early 2009, the size of the balance 
sheet has decreased somewhat, which reﬂ  ects a runoff 
in credit extended through the Commercial Paper Fund-
ing Facility and a decrease in draws on liquidity swap 
lines with foreign central banks. 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
International Financial Markets
Although foreign banks continued to report losses over 
the summer and funding conditions remained strained, 
global ﬁ  nancial markets were relatively calm in July 
and August of 2008. This situation changed abruptly 
in September, as global interbank and other funding 
markets seized up and lending came to a near standstill. 
These developments were followed by the collapse of 
several prominent foreign ﬁ  nancial institutions. In late 
September, the banks Bradford and Bingley, Fortis, and 
Dexia were partially or fully nationalized, and Hypo 
Real Estate Holding AG received a large capital injec-
tion from the German government.  
  The deepening of the crisis led many foreign govern-
ments to announce unprecedented measures to restore 
credit market functioning, including large-scale capi-
tal injections into the banking system, expansions of 
deposit insurance programs, and guarantees of some 
forms of bank debt. Most major central banks cut policy 
rates sharply as the ﬁ  nancial crisis led to a dramatic 
deterioration in the outlook for economic activity and 
inﬂ  ation; in October, coordinated policy rate cuts were 
made by the Federal Reserve and ﬁ  ve other central 
banks. To address global dollar funding pressures, the 
Federal Reserve greatly expanded its program of liquid-
ity swaps with foreign central banks by increasing 
the dollar amounts extended as well as the number of 
countries with which it has swap agreements. (The cen-
tral banks with swap arrangements are discussed in the 
appendix.)  These concerted global measures seem to 
have soothed conditions and had restored some measure 
of stability to markets by the end of the year, although 
credit markets abroad are still impaired.
  Stock markets in the advanced foreign economies 
were nearly ﬂ  at over July and August of 2008 but fell 
sharply beginning in late September; market volatility 
rose to record levels with the deepening of the ﬁ  nancial 
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Japan, and Canada fell 20 percent to 40 percent over the 
second half of last year and have continued to decline 
this year (ﬁ  gure 45). Long-term sovereign bond yields 
fell sharply in Europe and Canada in the latter part 
of 2008, which reﬂ  ected both the easing of monetary 
policy and diminished growth prospects, but have risen 
somewhat, on balance, in early 2009 (ﬁ  gure 46). In 
contrast, yields on inﬂ  ation-protected long-term securi-
ties rose in many countries, and inﬂ  ation compensation 
(the difference between yields on nominal securities 
and those on inﬂ  ation-protected securities) fell sharply. 
As in the United States, measures of inﬂ  ation compen-
sation were quite volatile, however, as the liquidity of 
inﬂ  ation-protected securities fell markedly. 
  Although in early 2008 the emerging market econo-
mies looked as if they might escape the most serious 
consequences of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the intensiﬁ  cation 
of ﬁ  nancial strains in September 2008 led to sharp and 
sudden capital outﬂ  ows from many emerging mar-
kets as investors in the advanced economies sought to 
repatriate funds. Downdrafts in ﬁ  nancial markets were 
reinforced by concerns over the effects of declining 
exports to the advanced economies and, for commodity 
exporters, plummeting commodity prices. Most stock 
markets in the emerging economies fell 20 percent to 
40 percent, on net, over the second half of the year, and 
risk spreads on emerging market debt rose sharply (ﬁ  g-
ure 47). 
  The Federal Reserve’s broadest measure of the nom-
inal trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the dol-
lar rose about 12 percent, on net, over the second half 
of 2008 (ﬁ  gure 48). Much of this rise reﬂ  ected gains 
against major foreign currencies. The dollar appreciated 
13 percent against the euro, 20 percent against 
the Canadian dollar, and 36 percent against sterling 
(ﬁ  gure 49). The dollar’s strength was attributable to 
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NOTE: The data are daily. The last observation for each series is February
18, 2009. Because the Tokyo Exchange was closed on December 31, 2007,
the Japan index is scaled so that the December 28, 2007, closing value equals
100. 
SOURCE: For euro area, Dow Jones Euro STOXX Index; for Canada,
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index; for Japan, Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TOPIX); and for the United Kingdom, London Stock Exchange
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NOTE: The data are daily. The last observation for each series is February
18, 2009. Because the Shanghai Stock Exchange was closed on December 31,
2007, the China index is scaled so that the December 28, 2007, closing value
equals 100. The Latin American economies are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
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SOURCE: For Latin America and emerging Asia, Morgan Stanley Capital
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tors that foreign growth would slow much more sharply 
than had been earlier anticipated as well as an increase 
in demand for the relative safety of U.S. assets such as 
Treasury securities. In contrast to its strength against 
other major currencies, the dollar depreciated 14 per-
cent against the yen, as market volatility led many Japa-
nese investors to sell foreign assets.
  The dollar also rose against the currencies of most 
emerging market economies, including appreciation of 
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48. U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate, broad index,  
2005–09  
NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for the series is February 18, 2009. The broad index is a
weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against
the currencies of a large group of the most important U.S. trading partners.
The index weights, which change over time, are derived from U.S. export
shares and from U.S. and foreign import shares. 
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NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for each series is February 18, 2009. 
SOURCE: Bloomberg. 
and the Brazilian real. The dollar appreciated much 
less against most emerging Asian currencies, although 
it did rise more than 20 percent against the Korean won. 
In response to these pressures, many central banks in 
both Latin America and Asia intervened in support of 
their currencies. 
The Financial Account
Although the current account deﬁ  cit is estimated to 
have narrowed in 2008, it remains sizable. Turbulence 
in global ﬁ  nancial markets has noticeably changed the 
composition of the associated ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. Before 
the turmoil, ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows were primarily in the 
form of net purchases of U.S. securities by foreign pri-
vate investors and somewhat smaller net purchases by 
foreign ofﬁ  cial institutions. Since late 2007, however, 
foreign private net purchases of U.S. securities have 
dropped sharply, leaving foreign ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ows to play 
a much larger role (ﬁ  gure 50). Furthermore, whereas 
before the turmoil private foreign investors purchased 
large sums of U.S. assets issued by private entities, 
since then foreign investments—both ofﬁ  cial and 
private—have been dominated by a “ﬂ  ight to safety” to 
U.S. Treasury securities. Finally, in the third quarter of 
2008, reductions in holdings of foreign assets by private 
U.S. residents played an unusual role, which added sig-
niﬁ  cantly to net private inﬂ  ows.
 Overall,  inﬂ  ows from foreign private acquisitions 
of U.S. securities in 2008 were just one-ﬁ  fth of the 
ﬂ  ows obtained in the previous two years, on average. 
Although purchases of U.S. Treasury securities rose 
considerably, there were unprecedented net sales in oth-
er U.S. securities in 2008 (ﬁ  gure 51). Foreign demand 
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bonds, with the weakness especially pronounced in the 
second half of the year. 
 Foreign  ofﬁ  cial net purchases of U.S. assets 
remained relatively steady in 2008, at a pace slightly 
above that of 2007. However, the composition of 
ofﬁ  cial net purchases in the third and fourth quarters 
moved sharply away from U.S. agency securities and 
was concentrated almost exclusively in U.S. Treasury 
securities. Foreign ofﬁ  cial acquisitions continued to be 
dominated by Asian institutions in 2008.
  Prior to the turmoil, U.S. investors’ net purchases of 
foreign securities typically generated a ﬁ  nancial out-
ﬂ  ow. These purchases slowed following the turmoil and 
more recently have turned to sizable net sales—gener-
ating a ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ow—as U.S. investors have pulled 
out of foreign investments. In addition, U.S. residents 
considerably reduced their deposits in foreign banks in 
2008.
  The turmoil also led to unusual ﬂ  ows from the bank-
ing sector and from ofﬁ  cial transactions in the form of 
the Federal Reserve’s liquidity swap arrangements with 
foreign central banks. Net ﬂ  ows reported by banking 
ofﬁ  ces in the United States are typically small. Since 
the onset of the turmoil through mid-2008, however, 
banks have generated unusually large outﬂ  ows, in part 
reﬂ  ecting a response to heightened demand resulting 
from interbank funding pressures in European markets. 
As central banks acted to address these concerns with 
the expansion of the swap arrangements in September 
2008, the private banking outﬂ  ows slowed to a halt. 
Foreign central banks eased dollar pressures abroad 
by lending to their domestic banks the dollar liquidity 
acquired from the Federal Reserve. Further drawings 
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to a strong reversal of banking ﬂ  ows (back toward the 
United States, on net) in the fourth quarter.
Advanced Foreign Economies
Economic performance in the major advanced foreign 
economies weakened sharply in the second half of 
2008, as global ﬁ  nancial market turbulence, shrinking 
world trade, and collapsing business and consumer con-
ﬁ  dence weighed on activity. Across the advanced for-
eign economies, credit conditions and lending standards 
tightened considerably, industrial production declined, 
and retail sales slowed. Housing markets weakened 
everywhere and performed particularly poorly in coun-
tries that earlier had experienced housing booms, such 
as Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. By the third 
quarter of last year, both Japan and the euro area had 
entered recessions, and output fell sharply in all the 
major advanced foreign economies in the fourth quar-
ter, with most countries experiencing especially severe 
declines in exports and private investment. 
  After surging in response to accelerating commod-
ity prices in the ﬁ  rst half of last year, headline rates of 
inﬂ  ation fell noticeably as a result of collapsing com-
modity prices and worsening economic conditions. 
The 12-month change in consumer prices peaked in the 
third quarter of 2008 for all the major economies, and 
the peak values ranged from a high of 5¼ percent in 
the United Kingdom to 2¼ percent in Japan. The most 
recent ﬁ  gures are substantially lower and range from 
3 percent in the United Kingdom to below 1 percent in 
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the swings in consumer price inﬂ  ation have been more 
subdued. After moving up somewhat during most of 
2008, core inﬂ  ation is now declining in most advanced 
foreign economies. 
 Ofﬁ  cial monetary policy rates have been lowered 
signiﬁ  cantly since the beginning of 2008 in response to 
severe ﬁ  nancial market turbulence, decelerating eco-
nomic activity, and waning inﬂ  ation. After some easing 
early last year by the Bank of England and the Bank of 
Canada, rapidly rising food and energy costs led these 
central banks to pause, and, in the case of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), raise rates in the summer. How-
ever, in the fall, as ﬁ  nancial conditions deteriorated 
and commodity prices fell, policymakers in the major 
industrial economies cut rates sharply, including a coor-
dinated move in October. In total, the Bank of England 
has lowered its policy rate from 5½ percent in January 
of 2008 to 1 percent. The Bank of Canada and the 
ECB have also dropped rates to 1 percent and 
2 percent, respectively. In Japan, interest rates were 
lowered to near zero in December (ﬁ  gure 53). In addi-
tion to substantial reductions in policy rates, central 
banks in the major advanced economies have taken a 
number of extraordinary measures to improve liquidity 
in ﬁ  nancial markets, including the large-scale provision 
of term funding in local currency and dollar markets 
and the signiﬁ  cant expansion of allowable collateral for 
central bank funding. Some foreign central banks are 
turning to or contemplating other measures to support 
activity, such as purchases of private-sector assets. Gov-
ernments in the major industrial economies have also 
announced ﬁ  scal packages to bolster activity.  
Emerging Market Economies
Economic performance weakened dramatically in 
emerging market countries in the second half of 2008. 
In the ﬁ  rst half of the year, growth in many emerging 
market economies was relatively robust, and as food 
and energy prices soared, policymakers focused on con-
taining inﬂ  ationary pressure. However, in the second 
half, weaker demand from the advanced economies 
weighed on the export sectors of these countries, global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil led to tighter credit conditions, and in 
some cases, plunging commodity prices contributed to 
economic difﬁ  culties. By the end of the year, output in 
emerging market economies was dropping sharply, and 
inﬂ  ationary pressures were moderating. These devel-
opments prompted policymakers in many countries to 
shift their focus to more stimulative monetary and ﬁ  scal 
policies to mitigate the effects of the economic 
downturn.  
  In China, the pace of activity slowed substantially 
in 2008, and concerns regarding high inﬂ  ation and an 
overheating economy receded and gave way to efforts 
to bolster activity. Since September, Chinese authori-
ties have lowered benchmark lending and deposit rates 
as well as bank reserve requirements several times. In 
November, a large ﬁ  scal stimulus plan that focused on 
infrastructure investment was announced, and Chinese 
authorities also enacted other policies designed to sup-
port the export sector, the real estate market, and small 
and medium-sized enterprises. After appreciating signif-
icantly in the ﬁ  rst half of the year, the exchange value 
of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar was relatively stable 
in the second half of 2008.
  Elsewhere in emerging Asia, the downturn in activ-
ity has been dramatic. Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan all posted substantial contractions 
in real GDP at the end of last year. Demand for these 
countries’ goods from the advanced economies and Chi-
na plunged in the second half of 2008, and authorities 
across emerging Asia have introduced more stimulative 
monetary and ﬁ  scal policies to bolster their economies.
  In Mexico, growth was anemic in the ﬁ  rst half of 
last year, but it improved in the third quarter, largely 
because of strong activity in the agricultural and service 
sectors. However, output is estimated to have declined 
sharply in the fourth quarter, as weakness in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector and ﬁ  nancial stress have begun to 
weigh on the Mexican economy. In Brazil, economic 
activity remained ﬁ  rm through much of the year, but 
indicators suggest that output fell sharply in the fourth 
quarter. 
  Russia’s economy and ﬁ  nancial system experienced 
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because of the steep drop in oil and other commodity 
prices, the turmoil in global ﬁ  nancial markets, and geo-
political tensions resulting from the conﬂ  ict with Geor-
gia. Russian international reserves fell substantially, 
largely because of interventions to support the currency 
and the ﬁ  nancial and corporate sectors more broadly. 
Several countries in emerging Europe also came under 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial pressures in the fourth quarter of 
2008, which reﬂ  ected the aftermath of a period of very 
high rates of credit expansion as well as large current 
account deﬁ  cits and external ﬁ  nancing needs. Hungary, 
Latvia, Serbia, and Ukraine received ofﬁ  cial assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  33
Part 3 
Monetary Policy in 2008 and Early 2009
After easing the stance of monetary policy 225 basis 
points over the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target federal 
funds rate further in the second half, ultimately bringing 
it to a range of 0 to ¼ percent (ﬁ  gure 54).12 The Fed-
eral Reserve also took a number of additional actions 
to increase liquidity and improve market function-
ing. Some of these measures resulted in a substantial 
increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet; further, the FOMC announced at its December 
meeting that the focus of policy going forward would 
be to support the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
stimulate the economy through open market operations 
and other measures that would sustain the size of the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet at a high level.
  Information available last summer indicated that 
residential construction remained on a downward trend, 
the labor market had weakened further, and industrial 
production had declined. Although aggregate output was 
reported to have expanded in the second quarter, ﬁ  nan-
cial market developments suggested that the economy 
would likely come under considerable stress in the near 
future—in particular, tight credit conditions, the ongo-
ing housing contraction, and the rise in energy prices 
were expected to weigh on economic growth over the 
subsequent few quarters. Core consumer price inﬂ  a-
tion remained relatively stable, but headline inﬂ  ation 
was elevated as a result of large increases in food and 
energy prices.
  With these considerations in mind, the FOMC kept 
the target federal funds rate unchanged at 2 percent at 
its August meeting. The accompanying policy state-
ment indicated that, although downside risks to growth 
remained, the upside risks to inﬂ  ation were also of 
signiﬁ  cant concern to the Committee. This risk assess-
ment, which many market participants reportedly inter-
preted as essentially balanced, was in line with expec-
tations at the time. Accordingly, the expected path for 
policy was little changed in the wake of the announce-
ment, and the response in broader ﬁ  nancial markets was 
minimal.
  By the time of the meeting on September 16, the out-
look for inﬂ  ation had moderated as a result of substan-
tial declines in the prices of oil and other commodities 
as well as weakening aggregate demand. Various mea-
sures of inﬂ  ation expectations declined between the two 
12.  Members of the FOMC in 2008 consisted of members of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System plus the presi-
dents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, Dallas, Minneapo-
lis, New York, and Philadelphia; in 2009, FOMC members consist of 
members of the Board of Governors plus the presidents of the Federal 
Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Richmond, and San 
Francisco. Participants at FOMC meetings consist of members of the 
Board of Governors and all Reserve Bank presidents.
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meetings, nominal wage increases continued to be mod-
erate, and productivity growth remained solid. In addi-
tion, declining employment and softening ﬁ  nal sales 
contributed to a weaker outlook for near-term economic 
activity. Still, some ﬁ  rms reportedly were continuing 
to pass through to their customers previous increases 
in the costs of energy and raw materials, and readings 
on core and headline inﬂ  ation remained elevated. In 
this environment, the Committee was concerned that 
high inﬂ  ation might become embedded in expectations 
and thereby impart considerable momentum to over-
all inﬂ  ation. Financial strains had increased over the 
intermeeting period, although the consequences of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings on September 
15 were not yet clear at the time of the meeting. Indeed, 
the substantial easing of monetary policy over the pre-
vious year, combined with ongoing measures to foster 
market liquidity, was seen as likely to support activity 
going forward. Thus, members agreed that keeping the 
federal funds target rate unchanged at 2 percent at the 
September meeting was appropriate.
  Over the following weeks, stresses in ﬁ  nancial mar-
kets continued to mount. Interest rate spreads in inter-
bank funding markets widened markedly, corporate and 
municipal bond yields rose, and equity prices dropped 
sharply. The decline in the net asset value of a major 
money market mutual fund below $1 per share sparked 
a ﬂ  ight out of prime money market funds and caused a 
severe impairment of the functioning of the commercial 
paper market. In response to the extraordinary stresses 
in ﬁ  nancial markets, the Federal Reserve, together with 
U.S. government entities and many foreign central 
banks and governments, implemented a number of 
unprecedented policy initiatives. Measures taken by the 
Federal Reserve around this time, discussed in detail in 
the appendix, included the establishment of the Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility, Commercial Paper Funding Facility, 
and Money Market Investor Funding Facility, which 
were intended to improve the liquidity in short-term 
debt markets and ease the strains in credit markets more 
broadly. In addition, to address the sizable demand 
for dollar funding in foreign jurisdictions, the FOMC 
authorized increases in its existing liquidity swap lines 
with foreign central banks and established lines with 
additional central banks. In domestic markets, the Fed-
eral Reserve raised the regular auction amounts of the 
28- and 84-day maturity Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
auctions and announced two forward TAF auctions to 
provide funding over year-end.
  The expansion of existing liquidity facilities and the 
creation of new facilities contributed to a substantial 
increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet. Two initiatives were introduced to help 
manage the expansion of the balance sheet and 
promote control of the federal funds rate. First, on 
September 17, the Treasury announced a temporary 
Supplementary Financing Program at the request of 
the Federal Reserve. Under this program, the Treasury 
issues short-term bills over and above its regular bor-
rowing program, with the proceeds deposited at the 
Federal Reserve. Second, using authority granted under 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the Federal 
Reserve announced on October 6 that it would begin 
paying interest on required and excess reserve balances. 
The payment of interest on excess reserves was intend-
ed to assist in maintaining the federal funds rate close 
to the target set by the Committee by creating a ﬂ  oor on 
interbank market rates. Initially, the interest rate paid on 
required reserve balances was set as a spread below the 
average targeted federal funds rate established by the 
FOMC over each reserve maintenance period, and the 
rate paid on excess balances was set as a spread below 
the lowest targeted federal funds rate for each reserve 
maintenance period. Subsequently, with the federal 
funds rate trading consistently below the target rate, the 
spreads were eliminated.
  In late September and into October, macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorated in both the United States and 
Europe, prices of crude oil and other commodities 
dropped substantially, and some measures of expected 
inﬂ  ation declined. In light of these developments and 
the extraordinary turmoil in ﬁ  nancial markets, the Com-
mittee members agreed that downside risks to economic 
growth had increased and that upside risks to inﬂ  ation 
had diminished; at an unscheduled meeting in early 
October, the FOMC cut its target to 1½ percent in an 
unprecedented coordinated policy action with ﬁ  ve other 
major central banks. This action, along with the accom-
panying statement, led investors to mark down further 
the expected path for the federal funds rate.
  At its October 28–29 meeting, the FOMC lowered 
its target for the federal funds rate an additional 
50  basis points, to 1 percent. The Committee’s state-
ment noted that economic activity appeared to have 
slowed markedly, a development due importantly to 
weakening consumer and business spending and soften-
ing demand from many foreign economies. Moreover, 
the intensiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial market turmoil was likely 
to exert additional restraint on spending by further tight-
ening credit conditions for households and businesses. 
The Committee noted that, in light of the declines in the 
prices of energy and other commodities and the weaker 
prospects for economic activity, it expected inﬂ  ation to 
moderate in coming quarters to levels consistent with 
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downside, the Committee indicated that it would moni-
tor economic and ﬁ  nancial developments carefully and 
act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth 
and price stability.
  The decision of the FOMC at its October meet-
ing was broadly in line with market expectations and 
elicited only a modest reaction in ﬁ  nancial markets. 
However, subsequent economic data releases suggested 
that economic activity was weaker and inﬂ  ation lower 
than had been earlier anticipated. Those readings, along 
with continued strains in ﬁ  nancial markets that weighed 
on investor sentiment, contributed to a sharp downward 
revision in the expected path of policy over the follow-
ing weeks. Reﬂ  ecting investor concerns about the con-
dition of ﬁ  nancial institutions, spreads on credit default 
swaps for U.S. banks widened sharply, and those for 
insurance companies remained very elevated. 
  Available evidence also suggested further tightening 
in consumer and small business credit conditions; in 
view of this tightening, the Federal Reserve announced 
on November 25 plans for the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to support lending to 
these borrowers. The Federal Reserve also announced 
on November 25 that, to help reduce the cost and 
increase the availability of residential mortgage credit, 
it would initiate a program to purchase up to $100 bil-
lion in direct obligations of housing-related govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises and up to $500 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The announcement 
and implementation of the agency purchase program 
appeared to reduce spreads on agency debt; conditions 
for high-quality borrowers in the primary residential 
mortgage market subsequently recovered somewhat.
 Although  some  ﬁ  nancial markets exhibited signs of 
improved functioning ahead of the December meeting, 
ﬁ  nancial conditions generally remained very strained. 
Credit conditions had continued to tighten for both 
households and businesses, and ongoing declines in 
equity and house prices further reduced household 
wealth. Against this backdrop, indicators of aggregate 
economic activity continued to worsen. The Committee 
expected economic activity to contract sharply in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and in early 2009; it noted that 
the uncertainty surrounding the outlook was consider-
able and that the downside risk to even this dour trajec-
tory for economic activity was a serious concern. Inﬂ  a-
tion pressures had diminished appreciably as energy 
and other commodity prices dropped and economic 
activity slumped. Looking forward, members agreed 
that inﬂ  ation pressures appeared set to moderate further 
in coming quarters, and some saw risks that inﬂ  ation 
could drop below rates they viewed as most consistent 
over time with the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate for 
maximum employment and price stability.
  With the federal funds rate already trading at very 
low levels as a result of the large volume of excess 
reserves associated with the Federal Reserve’s liquid-
ity operations, participants agreed that the Committee 
would soon need to use other tools to impart additional 
monetary stimulus to the economy. The Federal Reserve 
had already adopted a series of programs that were pro-
viding liquidity support to a range of institutions and 
markets, and a continued focus on the quantity and the 
composition of Federal Reserve assets appeared to be 
necessary and desirable. Participants agreed that main-
tenance of a low level of short-term interest rates for 
some time and reliance on the use of balance sheet poli-
cies and communications about monetary policy could 
be effective and appropriate, in light of the sharp dete-
rioration in the economic outlook and the appreciable 
easing of inﬂ  ationary pressures.
  Accordingly, the Committee announced a target 
range for the federal funds rate of 0 to ¼ percent and 
indicated that weak economic conditions were likely to 
warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds 
rate for some time. The statement also noted that the 
size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet would be 
maintained at a high level through open market opera-
tions and other measures to support ﬁ  nancial markets 
and stimulate the economy. In addition, the statement 
indicated that the Committee stood ready to expand 
purchases of agency debt and agency MBS and that 
it was evaluating the potential beneﬁ  ts of purchasing 
longer-term Treasury securities. The FOMC members 
emphasized that their expectation about the path of 
the federal funds rate was conditioned on their view of 
the likely path of economic activity. The interest rates 
on required reserve balances and excess reserve bal-
ances were both set at 25 basis points. These monetary 
policy decisions apparently were more aggressive than 
investors had been expecting. Market participants were 
somewhat surprised both by the size of the reduction in 
the target federal funds rate and by the statements that 
policy rates would likely remain low for some time and 
that the FOMC might engage in additional nontradition-
al policy actions such as the purchase of longer-term 
Treasury securities. 
  Incoming data over the following weeks indicated a 
continued sharp contraction in economic activity. The 
housing market remained on a steep downward trend, 
consumer spending continued its signiﬁ  cant decline, 
the slowdown in business equipment investment inten-
siﬁ  ed, and foreign demand weakened. Conditions in 
the labor market continued to deteriorate rapidly, and 
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line consumer prices fell in November and December, 
which reﬂ  ected declines in consumer energy prices; 
core consumer prices were about ﬂ  at in those months. 
Credit conditions generally remained tight, with ﬁ  nan-
cial markets fragile and some parts of the banking sec-
tor under substantial stress. However, modest signs of 
improvement were evident in some ﬁ  nancial markets—
particularly those that were receiving support from Fed-
eral Reserve liquidity facilities and other government 
actions.
  At the meeting in January 2009, participants antici-
pated that a gradual recovery in U.S. economic activity 
would begin in the second half of the year in response 
to monetary easing, another dose of ﬁ  scal stimulus, 
relatively low energy prices, and continued efforts by 
the government to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial sector and 
increase the availability of credit. As of late January, 
however, with ﬁ  nancial conditions strained and the 
near-term economic outlook weak, most participants 
agreed that the Committee should continue to focus 
on supporting the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
stimulating the economy through purchases of agency 
debt and MBS and other measures—including the 
implementation of the TALF—that will keep the size of 
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet at a high level for 
some time. Committee members agreed that keeping 
the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ per-
cent would be appropriate. They also agreed to continue 
using liquidity and asset-purchase programs to support 
the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets and to stimulate the 
economy. 
  In its January statement, the FOMC reemphasized 
that the Federal Reserve will use all available tools 
to promote the resumption of sustainable economic 
growth and to preserve price stability. The Committee 
also stated that, in addition to the purchases of agency 
debt and MBS already under way, it was prepared to 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving 
circumstances indicated that such transactions would be 
particularly effective in improving conditions in private 
credit markets. The Committee will continue to moni-
tor carefully the size and composition of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet in light of evolving ﬁ  nancial 
market developments. It will also continue to assess 
whether expansions of, or modiﬁ  cations to, lending 
facilities would serve to further support credit markets 
and economic activity and help preserve price stability.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  37
Part 4
Summary of Economic Projections
The following material appeared as an addendum to 
the minutes of the January 27–28, 2009, meeting of the 
Federal Open Market Committee.
In conjunction with the January 27–28, 2009 FOMC 
meeting, the members of the Board of Governors and 
the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, all of 
whom participate in deliberations of the FOMC, pro-
vided projections for economic growth, unemployment, 
and inﬂ  ation in 2009, 2010, 2011, and over the longer 
run. Projections were based on information available 
through the conclusion of the meeting, on each partici-
pant’s assumptions regarding a range of factors likely to 
affect economic outcomes, and on his or her assessment 
of appropriate monetary policy. “Appropriate monetary 
policy” is deﬁ  ned as the future policy that, based on 
current information, is deemed most likely to foster 
outcomes for economic activity and inﬂ  ation that best 
satisfy the participant’s interpretation of the Federal 
Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum employment and 
price stability. Longer-run projections represent each 
participant’s assessment of the rate to which each vari-
able would be expected to converge over time under 
appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of fur-
ther shocks.
  FOMC participants viewed the outlook for economic 
activity and inﬂ  ation as having weakened signiﬁ  cantly 
since last October, when their last projections were 
made. As indicated in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1, 
participants projected that real GDP would contract 
this year, that the unemployment rate would increase 
substantially, and that consumer price inﬂ  ation would 
be signiﬁ  cantly lower than in recent years. Given the 
strength of the forces currently weighing on the econ-
omy, participants generally expected that the recovery 
would be unusually gradual and prolonged:  All par-
ticipants anticipated that unemployment would remain 
substantially above its longer-run sustainable rate at 
the end of 2011, even absent further economic shocks; 
a few indicated that more than ﬁ  ve to six years would 
be needed for the economy to converge to a longer-run 
path characterized by sustainable rates of output growth 
and unemployment and by an appropriate rate of inﬂ  a-
tion. Participants generally judged that their projections 
for both economic activity and inﬂ  ation were subject 
to a degree of uncertainty exceeding historical norms. 
Nearly all participants viewed the risks to the growth 
outlook as skewed to the downside, and all participants 
saw the risks to the inﬂ  ation outlook as either balanced 
or tilted to the downside.
Table 1.  Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents, January 2009
Percent
Change in real GDP ................................  -1.3 to -0.5  2.5 to 3.3  3.8 to 5.0  2.5 to 2.7  -2.5 to 0.2  1.5 to 4.5  2.3 to 5.5  2.4 to 3.0   
  October projection ..........................  -0.2 to 1.1  2.3 to 3.2  2.8 to 3.6    n.a.  -1.0 to 1.8  1.5 to 4.5  2.0 to 5.0  n.a.
Unemployment rate  .................................  8.5 to 8.8  8.0 to 8.3  6.7 to 7.5  4.8 to 5.0  8.0 to 9.2  7.0 to 9.2  5.5 to 8.0    4.5 to 5.5
    October projection ..........................  7.1 to 7.6  6.5 to 7.3  5.5 to 6.6    n.a.   6.6 to 8.0  5.5 to 8.0  4.9 to 7.3    n.a.
PCE inﬂ  ation ...........................................  0.3 to 1.0  1.0 to 1.5  0.9 to 1.7  1.7 to 2.0  -0.5 to 1.5  0.7 to 1.8  0.2 to 2.1    1.5 to 2.0 
    October projection ..........................  1.3 to 2.0  1.4 to 1.8  1.4 to 1.7    n.a.  1.0 to 2.2  1.1 to 1.9  0.8 to 1.8    n.a. 
Core PCE inﬂ  ation3 .................................  0.9 to 1.1  0.8 to 1.5  0.7 to 1.5      0.6 to 1.5  0.4 to 1.7  0.0 to 1.8
    October projection ..........................  1.5 to 2.0  1.3 to 1.8  1.3 to 1.7      1.3 to 2.1  1.1 to 1.9  0.8 to 1.8   
NOTE:  Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and of inﬂ  ation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year 
indicated. PCE inﬂ  ation and core PCE inﬂ  ation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the 
price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year 
indicated. Each participant’s projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment 
of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The October 
projections were made in conjunction with the FOMC meeting on October 28-29, 2008. 
1.  The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
2.  The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants’ projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.
3.  Longer-run projections for core PCE inﬂ  ation are not collected.
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Figure 1. Central tendencies and ranges of economic projections, 2009–11 and over the longer run  
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The Outlook
Participants’ projections for the change in real GDP 
in 2009 had a central tendency of -1.3 to -0.5 percent, 
compared with the central tendency of -0.2 to 1.1 per-
cent for their projections last October. In explaining 
these downward revisions, participants referred to the 
further intensiﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and its 
effect on credit and wealth, the waning of consumer and 
business conﬁ  dence, the marked deceleration in global 
economic activity, and the weakness of incoming data 
on spending and employment. Participants anticipated a 
broad-based decline in aggregate output during the ﬁ  rst 
half of this year; they noted that consumer spending 
would likely be damped by the deterioration in labor 
markets, the tightness of credit conditions, the continu-
ing decline in house prices, and the recent sharp reduc-
tion in stock market wealth, and they saw reductions in 
consumer demand contributing to further weakness in 
business investment. However, participants expected 
that the economy would begin to recover—albeit 
gradually—during the second half of the year, mainly 
reﬂ  ecting the effects of ﬁ  scal stimulus and of Federal 
Reserve measures providing support to credit 
markets.
  Looking further ahead, participants’ growth projec-
tions had a central tendency of 2.5 to 3.3 percent for 
2010 and 3.8 to 5.0 percent for 2011. Participants gen-
erally expected that strains in ﬁ  nancial markets would 
ebb only slowly and hence that the pace of recovery 
in 2010 would be damped. Nonetheless, participants 
generally anticipated that real GDP growth would gain 
further momentum in 2011, reaching a pace that would 
temporarily exceed their estimates of the longer-run 
sustainable rate of economic growth and would thereby 
help reduce the slack in resource utilization. Most par-
ticipants expected that, absent further shocks, economic 
growth would eventually converge to a rate of 2.5 to 
2.7 percent, reﬂ  ecting longer-term trends in the growth 
of productivity and the labor force.
  Participants anticipated that labor market conditions 
would deteriorate substantially further over the course 
of this year, and nearly all expected that unemployment 
would still be well above its longer-run sustainable 
rate at the end of 2011. Participants’ projections for the 
average unemployment rate during the fourth quarter of 
2009 had a central tendency of 8.5 to 8.8 percent, mark-
edly higher than last December’s actual unemployment 
rate of 7.2 percent—the latest available ﬁ  gure at the 
time of the January FOMC meeting. Nearly all partici-
pants’ projections were more than a percentage point 
higher than their previous forecasts made last October, 
reﬂ  ecting the sharp rise in actual unemployment that 
occurred during the ﬁ  nal months of 2008 as well as 
participants’ weaker outlook for economic activity this 
year. Most participants anticipated that output growth 
in 2010 would not be substantially above its longer-run 
trend rate and hence that unemployment would decline 
only modestly next year. With economic activity and 
job creation generally projected to accelerate in 2011, 
participants anticipated that joblessness would decline 
more appreciably that year, as is evident from the cen-
tral tendency of 6.7 to 7.5 percent for their unemploy-
ment rate projections. Participants expected that the 
unemployment rate would decline further after 2011, 
and most saw it settling in at a rate of 4.8 to 5.0 percent 
over time.
  The central tendency of participants’ projections 
for total PCE inﬂ  ation this year was 0.3 to 1.0 percent, 
about a percentage point lower than the central tenden-
cy of their projections last October. Many participants 
noted that recent readings on inﬂ  ation had been surpris-
ingly low, and some anticipated that the unexpected 
declines in the prices of energy and other commodities 
that had occurred in the latter part of 2008 would con-
tinue to hold down inﬂ  ation at the consumer level in 
2009. Participants also marked down their projections 
for core PCE inﬂ  ation this year in light of their views 
about the indirect effects of lower energy prices and the 
inﬂ  uence of increased resource slack.
  Looking beyond this year, participants’ projections 
for total PCE inﬂ  ation had a central tendency of 1.0 to 
1.5 percent for 2010, 0.9 to 1.7 percent for 2011, and 
1.7 to 2.0 percent over the longer run. Participants’ 
longer-run projections for total PCE inﬂ  ation reﬂ  ected 
their individual assessments of the measured rates of 
inﬂ  ation consistent with the Federal Reserve’s dual 
mandate for promoting price stability and maximum 
employment. Most participants judged that a longer-
run PCE inﬂ  ation rate of 2 percent would be consistent 
with the dual mandate; others indicated that 1½ or 
1¾ percent inﬂ  ation would be appropriate. Modestly 
positive longer-run inﬂ  ation would allow the Commit-
tee to stimulate economic activity and support employ-
ment by setting the federal funds rate temporarily below 
the inﬂ  ation rate when the economy is buffeted by a 
large negative shock to demands for goods and services. 
Participants generally expected that core and overall 
inﬂ  ation would converge over time, and that persistent 
economic slack would continue to weigh on inﬂ  ation 
outcomes for the next few years and hence that total 
PCE inﬂ  ation in 2011 would still be below their assess-
ments of the appropriate inﬂ  ation rate for the longer 
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Risks to the Outlook
Participants continued to view uncertainty about the 
outlook for economic activity as higher than normal.13  
The risks to their projections for real GDP growth were 
judged as being skewed to the downside and the associ-
ated risks to their projections for the unemployment  
rate  were tilted to  the upside. Participants highlighted 
the considerable degree of uncertainty about the future 
course of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and its impact on the real 
economy; for example, rising unemployment and weak-
er growth could exacerbate delinquencies on household 
and business loans, leading to higher losses for ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms and so to a further tightening of credit conditions 
that would in turn put further downward pressure on 
spending to a greater degree than currently foreseen. 
In addition, some participants noted that a substantial 
degree of uncertainty was associated with gauging the 
stimulative effects of nontraditional monetary policy 
tools that are now being employed given that con-
ventional policy easing was limited by the zero lower 
bound on nominal interest rates. Others referred to 
uncertainties regarding the size, composition, and effec-
tiveness of the ﬁ  scal stimulus package—which was still 
under consideration at the time of the FOMC meeting—
and of further measures to stabilize the banking system.
  As in October, most participants continued to view 
the uncertainty surrounding their inﬂ  ation projections 
as higher than historical norms. A slight majority of 
participants judged the risks to the inﬂ  ation outlook 
as roughly balanced, while the rest viewed these risks 
as skewed to the downside. Participants indicated that 
elevated uncertainty about global growth was clouding 
the outlook for prices of energy and other commodities 
and hence contributing to greater uncertainty in their 
inﬂ  ation projections. Many participants stated that their 
assessments regarding the level of uncertainty and bal-
ance of risks to the inﬂ  ation outlook were closely linked 
to their judgments about the uncertainty and risks to the 
outlook for economic activity. Some participants noted 
the risk that inﬂ  ation expectations might become unan-
chored and drift downward in response to persistently 
low inﬂ  ation outcomes, while others pointed to the 
possibility of an upward shift if investors became con-
cerned that stimulative policy measures might not be 
unwound in a timely fashion once the economy begins 
to recover.
Diversity of Views
Figures 2.A and 2.B provide further details on the diver-
sity of participants’ views regarding likely outcomes for 
real GDP growth and the unemployment rate, respec-
tively. For 2009 to 2011, the dispersion in participants’ 
projections for each variable was roughly the same as 
for their projections last October. This dispersion main-
ly indicated the diversity of participants’ assessments 
regarding the stimulative effects of ﬁ  scal policy, the 
pace of recovery in ﬁ  nancial markets, and the evolution 
of households’ desired saving rates. The dispersion in 
participants’ longer-run projections reﬂ  ected differences 
in their estimates regarding the sustainable rates of out-
put growth and unemployment to which the economy 
would converge under appropriate policy and in the 
absence of any further shocks.
  Figures 2.C and 2.D provide corresponding infor-
mation regarding the diversity of participants’ views 
regarding the inﬂ  ation outlook. The dispersion in par-
ticipants’ projections for total PCE inﬂ  ation in 2009 
was substantially greater than for their projections made 
last October, due to increased diversity of participants’ 
views regarding the near-term evolution of prices 
of energy and raw materials and the extent to which 
changes in those prices would be likely to pass through 
into overall inﬂ  ation. The dispersion in participants’ 
projections for core PCE inﬂ  ation in 2009 was notice-
ably lower than last October, but the dispersion in their 
13.  Table 2 provides estimates of forecast uncertainty for the 
change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, and total consumer 
price inﬂ  ation over the period from 1987 to 2007.  At the end of this 
summary, the box “Forecast Uncertainty” discusses the sources and 
interpretation of uncertainty in economic forecasts and explains the 
approach used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending partici-
pants’ projections.
Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges
Percentage points
Change in real GDP1 .........................................  ±1.2  ±1.4  ±1.4
Unemployment rate1.......................................... ±0.5  ±0.8  ±1.0 
Total consumer prices2 ......................................  ±0.9  ±1.0  ±0.9
NOTE:  Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the root mean squared 
error of projections that were released in the winter from 1987 through 2007 for the 
current and following two years by various private and government forecasters. As 
described in the box “Forecast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is 
about a 70 percent probability that actual outcomes for real GDP, unemployment, 
and consumer prices will be in ranges implied by the average size of projection 
errors made in the past. Further information is in David Reifschneider and Peter 
Tulip (2007), “Gauging the Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook from Historical 
Forecasting Errors,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-60 (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November). 
1. For  deﬁ  nitions, refer to general note in table 1.
2.  Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure that has 
been most widely used in government and private economic forecasts. Projection 
is percent change, fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the 
year indicated. The slightly narrower estimated width of the conﬁ  dence interval 
for inﬂ  ation in the third year compared with that for the second year is likely the 
result of using a limited sample period for computing these statistics.
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projections for core inﬂ  ation in 2010 and 2011 was 
markedly wider, reﬂ  ecting varying assessments about 
the timing and pace of economic recovery, the sensi-
tivity of inﬂ  ation to slack in resource utilization, the 
prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity, and the 
likelihood that inﬂ  ation expectations will remain ﬁ  rmly 
anchored. A few participants anticipated that inﬂ  ation 
in 2011 would be close to their longer-run projections. 
However, most participants’ projections for total PCE 
inﬂ  ation in 2011 were below their longer-run projec-
tions, primarily reﬂ  ecting the anticipated effects of 
substantial slack over the next three years; this inﬂ  ation 
gap was about ¼ to ½ percentage point for some par-
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The economic projections provided by the 
members of the Board of Governors and the 
presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks inform 
discussions of monetary policy among policy-
makers and can aid public understanding of the 
basis for policy actions. Considerable uncer-
tainty attends these projections, however. The 
economic and statistical models and relation-
ships used to help produce economic forecasts 
are necessarily imperfect descriptions of the real 
world. And the future path of the economy can 
be affected by myriad unforeseen developments 
and events. Thus, in setting the stance of mon-
etary policy, participants consider not only what 
appears to be the most likely economic outcome 
as embodied in their projections, but also the 
range of alternative possibilities, the likelihood 
of their occurring, and the potential costs to the 
economy should they occur.
  Table 2 summarizes the average historical 
accuracy of a range of forecasts, including those 
reported in past Monetary Policy Reports and 
those prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff 
in advance of meetings of the Federal Open 
Market Committee. The projection error ranges 
shown in the table illustrate the considerable 
uncertainty associated with economic forecasts. 
For example, suppose a participant projects that 
real GDP and total consumer prices will rise 
steadily at annual rates of, respectively, 3 percent 
and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attending those 
projections  is  similar  to that  experienced  in 
the past and the risks around the projections are 
broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 
2 would imply a probability of about 70 percent 
that actual GDP would expand between 1.8 per-
cent to 4.2 percent in the current year and 
1.6 percent to 4.4 percent in the  second and 
third years. The corresponding 70 percent confi-
dence intervals for overall inflation would be 
1.1 percent to 2.9 percent in the current year, 
1.0 percent to 3.0 percent in the second year, 
and 1.1 percent to 2.9 percent in the third year.
  Because current conditions may differ from 
those that prevailed on average over history, 
participants provide judgments as to whether the 
uncertainty attached to their projections of each 
variable is greater than, smaller than, or broadly 
similar to typical levels of forecast uncertainty 
in the past as shown in table 2. Participants also 
provide judgments as to whether the risks to their 
projections are weighted to the upside, down-
side, or are broadly balanced. That is, partici-
pants judge whether each variable is more likely 
to be above or below their projections of the 
most likely outcome. These judgments about the 
uncertainty and the risks attending each partici-
pant’s projections are distinct from the diversity 
of participants’ views about the most likely out-
comes. Forecast uncertainty is concerned with 
the risks associated with a particular projection, 
rather than with divergences across a number of 
different projections.
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Appendix 
Federal Reserve Initiatives to Address 
Financial Strains
Since the onset of the ﬁ  nancial turmoil in the summer of 
2007, the Federal Reserve has announced several new 
measures to address the strains in ﬁ  nancial markets, as 
well as enhancements to its existing liquidity facilities.
(For outstanding balances related to these facilities, see 
table.)
Provision of Liquidity to Banks and Dealers 
Modiﬁ  cations to the Primary Credit Program
Following the onset of the ﬁ  nancial turmoil, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board announced temporary changes to 
its primary credit discount window facility on August 
17, 2007. These changes were designed to provide 
depositories with greater assurance about the cost and 
availability of funding. First, the Federal Reserve Board 
approved a 50 basis point reduction in the primary 
credit rate to narrow the spread between the primary 
credit rate and the Federal Open Market Committee’s 
target federal funds rate to 50 basis points. Second, 
the Federal Reserve Board announced a change to the 
Reserve Banks’ usual practices to allow the provision of 
term ﬁ  nancing for as long as 30 days, renewable by the 
borrower.
  To bolster market liquidity further in the face of 
increasing ﬁ  nancial strains, on March 16, 2008, the 
Federal Reserve Board unanimously approved a request 
by the Federal Reserve Banks to decrease the spread 
of the primary credit rate over the FOMC’s target fed-
eral funds rate to ¼ percentage point. The Board also 
approved an increase in the maximum maturity of pri-
mary credit loans to 90 days from 30 days.
The Term Auction Facility
To address elevated pressures in short-term funding 
markets, in December 2007 the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System approved the establishment 
of a Term Auction Facility (TAF). Under this program, 
the Federal Reserve auctions term funds to depository 
institutions against the wide variety of collateral that 
Federal Reserve provision of liquidity and credit, 2007–09
Millions of dollars
Provision of liquidity to banks and dealers
Primary credit program .....................................  8,620  24,095  65,144
Term Auction Facility .......................................  40,000  150,000  447,563
Liquidity swaps with foreign central banks ......  21,000  62,000  375,005
Securities lent under the Term Securities 
  Lending  Facility  ........................................  n.a.  104,097 115,280 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility and other 
 broker-dealer  credit  .......................................  n.a.  1,455  25,268
 
Provision of liquidity to other market
 participants    
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
    Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility  ...  n.a.  n.a.  12,722
Net portfolio holdings of Commercial Paper 
  Funding  Facility    .......................................  n.a.  n.a.  248,671
Net portfolio holdings of LLCs funded 
    through the Money Market Investor 
  Funding  Facility  ........................................  n.a.  n.a.  0
Support of critical institutions    
Net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane I, II, 
    and III LLCs1............................................... n.a.  29,970  72,231
Credit extended to American International 
   Group,  Inc.  ..................................................  n.a.  n.a.  37,357
NOTE: LLC is a limited liability company.
1. The Federal Reserve has extended credit to several LLCs in conjunction 
with efforts to support critical institutions. Maiden Lane LLC was formed to 
acquire certain assets of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Maiden Lane II LLC 
was formed to purchase residential mortgage-backed securities from the U.S. 
securities lending reinvestment portfolio of subsidiaries of American Interna-
tional Group, Inc. (AIG). Maiden Lane III LLC was formed to purchase multi-
sector collateralized debt obligations on which the Financial Products group of 
AIG has written credit default swap contracts. 
n.a. Not available.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.     
  Dec. 31,   June 30,  Feb. 18,
  2007 2008 2009
Asset
can be used to secure loans at the discount window. By 
increasing the access of depository institutions to fund-
ing, the TAF has supported the ability of such institu-
tions to meet the credit needs of their customers.
  Each depository institution that is judged to be in 
generally sound ﬁ  nancial condition by its Reserve Bank 
(and likely to remain so over the term of the loan) can 
participate in TAF auctions. All advances must be fully 
collateralized. Each TAF auction is for a ﬁ  xed amount 
of funds, with the rate determined by the auction pro-
cess (subject to a minimum bid rate). A depository insti-
tution submits bids through its Reserve Bank. The mini-
mum bid rate for the auctions was initially established 
at the overnight index swap (OIS) rate corresponding 
to the maturity of the credit being auctioned. In January 
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rate paid by the Federal Reserve on excess reserve 
balances. 
  Initially, TAF auctions were in amounts of $20 bil-
lion and provided primarily 28-day term funds. Over 
the course of 2008, the Federal Reserve extended the 
term of some auctions to 84 days and raised the regular 
amounts of both the 28- and 84-day TAF auctions to 
$150 billion. The Federal Reserve also conducted two 
forward TAF auctions in November for $150 billion 
each, which provided funding over year-end.
Liquidity Swap Lines with 
Foreign Central Banks
To address the increasing demand for dollar funding in 
foreign jurisdictions, in December 2007, the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) authorized tempo-
rary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) 
with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB). These arrangements initially 
provided dollars in amounts of up to $20 billion and 
$4 billion to the ECB and the SNB, respectively, for use 
in their jurisdictions. The FOMC approved these liquid-
ity swap lines for a period of up to six months and later 
extended this term to October 30, 2009.
  As demand for dollar funding rose further over the 
course of 2008, the FOMC authorized the expansion of 
its existing swap lines with the ECB and SNB. In the 
fall, the formal quantity limits on these lines, as well as 
on swap lines that were set up with the Bank of Japan 
and the Bank of England, were eliminated. The FOMC 
also authorized new liquidity swap lines with 10 other 
central banks:  the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Ban-
co Central do Brasil, the Bank of Canada, the Danmarks 
Nationalbank, the Bank of Korea, the Bank of Mexico, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges 
Riksbank.
The Term Securities Lending Facility
On March 11, 2008, to address increasing liquidity 
pressures in funding markets, the Federal Reserve 
announced the establishment of a Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF). Under the TSLF, the Federal 
Reserve lends up to $200 billion of Treasury securities 
to primary dealers for a term of 28 days (rather than 
overnight, as in the regular securities lending program); 
the lending is secured by a pledge of other securities. 
Initially, the eligible collateral included other Treasury 
securities, federal agency debt, federal agency residen-
tial mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and non-agency 
AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential MBS. In 
September, this list was broadened to include all invest-
ment-grade debt securities. The TSLF is intended to 
strengthen the ﬁ  nancing position of primary dealers and 
foster improved conditions in ﬁ  nancial markets more 
generally. Securities are made available through weekly 
auctions. This facility is currently scheduled to expire 
on October 30, 2009.
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility
To bolster market liquidity and promote orderly 
market functioning, on March 16, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve Board voted unanimously to authorize the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to create a lend-
ing facility—the Primary Dealer Credit Facility—to 
improve the ability of primary dealers to provide 
ﬁ  nancing to participants in securitization markets. 
This facility became available for business on Monday, 
March 17, and was originally instituted for a term of 
six months; this term was subsequently extended, and 
the facility is currently set to expire on October 30, 
2009. Collateral pledged to secure loans under this 
facility was initially limited to investment-grade debt 
securities; subsequently, eligible collateral was expand-
ed to include all collateral eligible for pledge in triparty 
funding arrangements through the major clearing banks. 
The interest rate charged on such credit is the same as 
the primary credit rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.
Provision of Liquidity to 
Other Market Participants
The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
On September 19, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced 
the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF). Under this program, the Federal Reserve 
extends nonrecourse loans at the primary credit rate to 
U.S. depository institutions and bank holding compa-
nies to ﬁ  nance their purchases of high-quality asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market 
mutual funds. This initiative is intended to assist money 
funds that hold such paper in meeting demands for 
redemptions by investors and to foster liquidity in the 
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the AMLF was initially authorized through January 
2009, the Board subsequently extended its operation 
through October 30, 2009.
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility
On October 7, the Federal Reserve authorized the cre-
ation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
to provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of com-
mercial paper. The CPFF is intended to improve liquid-
ity in short-term funding markets and thereby increase 
the availability of credit for businesses and households. 
The CPFF is currently authorized to purchase commer-
cial paper through October 30, 2009.
  Under the CPFF, Federal Reserve credit is provided 
to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that, in turn, pur-
chases commercial paper of eligible issuers. The Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York has committed to lend 
to the SPV on a recourse basis, with such loans secured 
by all the assets of the SPV. The SPV purchases from 
eligible issuers three-month U.S. dollar-denominated 
commercial paper through the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York’s primary dealers. Eligible issuers are U.S. 
issuers of commercial paper, including U.S. issuers with 
a foreign parent company. The SPV purchases only 
U.S. dollar-denominated commercial paper (including 
ABCP) that is rated at least A-1/P-1/F1.
  The maximum amount of a single issuer’s com-
mercial paper that the SPV may own at any time is the 
greatest amount of U.S. dollar-denominated commercial 
paper the issuer had outstanding on any day between 
January 1 and August 31, 2008. The SPV will not 
purchase additional commercial paper from an issuer 
whose total commercial paper outstanding to all inves-
tors (including the SPV) equals or exceeds the issuer’s 
limit. Pricing is based on the three-month OIS rate 
plus ﬁ  xed spreads. At the time of its registration to use 
the CPFF, each issuer must pay a facility fee equal to 
0.1 percent of the maximum amount of its commercial 
paper the SPV may own.
The Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility
On October 21, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced 
the creation of the Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF). Under the MMIFF, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York will provide senior secured 
funding to a series of SPVs to facilitate an industry-
supported private-sector initiative to ﬁ  nance the pur-
chase of eligible assets from eligible investors. Eligible 
assets include U.S. dollar-denominated certiﬁ  cates of 
deposit and commercial paper issued by highly rated 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and having remaining maturities 
of 90 days or less. Eligible investors currently include 
U.S. money market mutual funds and other similar enti-
ties. By backstopping the sales of money market instru-
ments in the secondary market, the MMIFF should 
improve the liquidity of money market investors, thus 
increasing their ability to meet redemption requests and 
their willingness to invest in money market instruments. 
Improved money market conditions enhance the ability 
of banks and other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries to accom-
modate the credit needs of businesses and households.
  The SPVs will purchase eligible money market 
instruments from eligible investors using ﬁ  nancing 
from the MMIFF and from the issuance of ABCP. 
The SPVs will issue to the seller of each eligible asset 
ABCP equal to 10 percent of the asset’s purchase price, 
with the remaining 90 percent of the transaction funded 
in cash. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York will 
commit to lend to each SPV 90 percent of the purchase 
price of each eligible asset. These loans will be on an 
overnight basis and at the primary credit rate. The loans 
will be senior to the ABCP, with recourse to the SPV, 
and secured by all the assets of the SPV. At the time 
of an SPV’s purchase of a debt instrument issued by a 
ﬁ  nancial institution, the debt instruments of that ﬁ  nan-
cial institution may not constitute more than 15 percent 
of the assets of the SPV, except during an initial ramp-
up period when the concentration limit may be 20 per-
cent. The SPVs ﬁ  nanced by the MMIFF are scheduled 
to enter a wind-down process on October 30, 2009.
The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility
On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board 
announced plans for the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF), a facility that will help market 
participants meet the credit needs of households and 
small businesses by supporting the issuance of asset-
backed securities (ABS) collateralized by student loans, 
auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed 
by the Small Business Administration. The TALF is 
designed to increase credit availability and support eco-
nomic activity by facilitating renewed issuance of con-
sumer and small business ABS at more normal interest 
rate spreads.
  Under the current design of the TALF, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York will lend up to $200 billion 
on a nonrecourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated 
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Eligible securities must have been issued on or after 
January 1, 2009, and all or substantially all of the credit 
exposures underlying eligible ABS must be newly or 
recently originated exposures to U.S.-domiciled obli-
gors. Originators of the credit exposures underlying eli-
gible ABS must have agreed to comply with, or already 
be subject to, the executive compensation requirements 
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
  On February 10, 2009, the Federal Reserve Board 
announced that it is prepared to undertake a substantial 
expansion of the TALF. The expansion could increase 
the size of the TALF to as much as $1 trillion and could 
broaden the eligible collateral to encompass other types 
of newly issued AAA-rated asset-backed securities, 
such as commercial MBS and private-label residential 
MBS. An expansion of the TALF would be supported 
by the provision by the Treasury of additional funds 
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
  All U.S. persons who own eligible collateral may 
participate in the TALF, and each borrower must use a 
primary dealer to access the TALF. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York will offer a ﬁ  xed amount of loans 
under the TALF on a monthly basis. Via a competitive, 
sealed-bid auction process, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York will award loans in amounts equal to the 
market value of the ABS less a haircut. The loans will 
be nonrecourse, will be secured at all times by the 
ABS, and will have a three-year term, with interest 
payable monthly. The Treasury, under the TARP, will 
provide credit protection to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York in connection with the TALF. The facility 
will cease making new loans on December 31, 2009, 
unless the Board agrees to extend the facility.
Direct Purchases of Assets
On September 19, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced 
that, to support market functioning, the Open Market 
Trading Desk would begin purchasing federal agency 
discount notes in the secondary market for the System 
Open Market Account.  These instruments are short-
term debt obligations issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Similar to 
secondary-market purchases of Treasury securities, 
purchases of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal 
Home Loan Bank debt are conducted with the Federal 
Reserve’s primary dealers through a series of competi-
tive auctions.
  To help reduce the cost and increase the availabil-
ity of residential mortgage credit, the Federal Reserve 
announced on November 25 a program to purchase up 
to $100 billion in direct obligations of housing-related 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and up to 
$500 billion in MBS backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and Ginnie Mae. 
Purchases of agency debt obligations began in Decem-
ber, and purchases of MBS began in January.
  The program to purchase GSE direct obligations 
has initially focused on ﬁ  xed-rate, noncallable, senior 
benchmark securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Over the 
course of the program, the Federal Reserve may change 
the scope of purchasable securities. Purchases will be 
made through a multiple-price competitive auction 
process. Primary dealers are eligible to transact directly 
with the Federal Reserve and are encouraged to submit 
offers for themselves and their customers.
Support of Critical Institutions
Bear Stearns
In mid-March of 2008, The Bear Stearns Companies, 
Inc., a major investment bank and primary dealer, was 
pushed to the brink of failure after losing the conﬁ  dence 
of investors and ﬁ  nding itself without access to short-
term ﬁ  nancing markets. A bankruptcy ﬁ  ling would have 
forced the secured creditors and counterparties of Bear 
Stearns to liquidate underlying collateral, and given the 
illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counterpar-
ties might well have sustained substantial losses. If they 
had responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of 
their holdings by pulling back from providing secured 
ﬁ  nancing to other ﬁ  rms and by dumping large volumes 
of illiquid assets on the market, a much broader ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis likely would have ensued. Thus, the Federal 
Reserve judged that a disorderly failure of Bear Stearns 
would have threatened overall ﬁ  nancial stability and 
would most likely have had signiﬁ  cant adverse implica-
tions for the U.S. economy.
  After discussions with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and in close consultation with the Trea-
sury, the Federal Reserve determined that it should 
invoke emergency authorities to provide special ﬁ  nanc-
ing to facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns by 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPMorgan Chase agreed to 
purchase Bear Stearns and assume the company’s ﬁ  nan-
cial obligations. The Federal Reserve agreed to supply 
term funding, secured by $30 billion in Bear Stearns 
assets, to facilitate the purchase. A limited liability 
company, Maiden Lane LLC, was formed to facili-
tate the arrangements associated with the purchase by 
acquiring certain assets of Bear Stearns and managing 
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credit extended and to minimize disruption to ﬁ  nancial 
markets. JPMorgan Chase completed the acquisition 
of Bear Stearns on June 26, and the Federal Reserve 
extended approximately $29 billion of funding to Maid-
en Lane on that date.
American International Group
In early September, the condition of American Inter-
national Group, Inc. (AIG), a large, complex ﬁ  nancial 
institution, deteriorated rapidly. In view of the likely 
systemic implications and the potential for signiﬁ  cant 
adverse effects on the economy of a disorderly failure 
of AIG, on September 16, the Federal Reserve Board, 
with the support of the Treasury, authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion 
to the ﬁ  rm to assist it in meeting its obligations and to 
facilitate the orderly sale of some of its businesses. This 
facility had a 24-month term, with interest accruing on 
the outstanding balance at a rate of 3-month Libor plus 
850 basis points, and was collateralized by all of the 
assets of AIG and its primary nonregulated subsidiaries. 
On October 8, the Federal Reserve announced an 
additional program under which it would lend up to 
$37.8 billion to ﬁ  nance investment-grade, ﬁ  xed-income 
securities held by AIG. These securities had previously 
been lent by AIG’s insurance company subsidiaries to 
third parties.
  In November, the Treasury announced that it would 
purchase $40 billion of newly issued AIG preferred 
shares under the TARP, which allowed the Federal 
Reserve to reduce from $85 billion to $60 billion the 
total amount available under the credit facility. Further, 
the interest rate on that facility was reduced to Libor 
plus 300 basis points, the fee on undrawn funds was 
reduced to 75 basis points, and the term of the facil-
ity was lengthened from two years to ﬁ  ve years. The 
Federal Reserve also announced plans to restructure 
its lending related to AIG by extending credit to two 
newly formed limited liability companies. The ﬁ  rst, 
Maiden Lane II LLC, received a $22.5 billion loan from 
the Federal Reserve and a $1 billion subordinated loan 
from AIG and purchased residential mortgage-backed 
securities from AIG. As a result of these actions, the 
securities lending facility established on October 8 was 
subsequently repaid and terminated. The second new 
company, Maiden Lane III LLC, received a $30 billion 
loan from the Federal Reserve and a $5 billion subor-
dinated loan from AIG and purchased multisector col-
lateralized debt obligations on which AIG has written 
credit default swap contracts.
Citigroup
Market anxiety about the condition of Citigroup inten-
siﬁ  ed in November 2008, especially in the wake of 
the ﬁ  rm’s announcement that it would lay off 52,000 
workers and absorb $17 billion in distressed assets from 
structured investment vehicles that it sponsored, and 
concerns about the ﬁ  rm’s access to funding mounted. 
To support ﬁ  nancial market stability, the U.S. govern-
ment on November 23 entered into an agreement with 
Citigroup to provide a package of capital, guarantees, 
and liquidity access. As part of the agreement, the 
Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) are providing capital protection against outsized 
losses on a pool of about $306 billion in residential and 
commercial real estate and other assets, Citigroup has 
issued preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC, and 
the Treasury has purchased an additional $20 billion in 
Citigroup preferred stock using TARP funds. In addi-
tion and if necessary, the Federal Reserve stands ready 
to backstop residual risk in the asset pool by providing 
nonrecourse credit.
Bank of America
Despite the improvement in bank funding markets after 
year-end, Bank of America also came under intense 
pressure. In mid-January 2009, the ﬁ  rm reported a 
$1.8 billion net loss for the fourth quarter, and it was 
further strained by its merger on January 2 with Merrill 
Lynch, which reported a fourth-quarter loss of 
$23 billion on a pretax basis and $16 billion on an 
after-tax basis. On January 16, Bank of America entered 
into an agreement with the Treasury, the FDIC, and the 
Federal Reserve similar to that arranged with Citigroup 
in November. Under the arrangement, the Treasury and 
the FDIC provide protection against the possibility of 
unusually large losses on a pool of approximately 
$118 billion of ﬁ  nancial instruments. In addition, and 
if necessary, the Federal Reserve will provide nonre-
course credit to Bank of America against this pool of 
ﬁ  nancial instruments. As a fee for this arrangement, 
Bank of America issued preferred shares to the Treasury 
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Abbreviations
ABS asset-backed  securities 
AMLF  Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
C&I  commercial and industrial
CMBS  commercial mortgage-backed securities
CPFF  Commercial Paper Funding Facility
CRE  commercial real estate
FOMC  Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee
GSE government-sponsored  enterprise
Libor  London interbank offered rate
MBS mortgage-backed  securities
MMIFF  Money Market Investor Funding Facility
OIS  overnight index swap 
PDCF  Primary Dealer Credit Facility
SFP  Supplementary Financing Program
TAF Term  Auction  Facility
TALF  Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
TLGP  Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
TSLF  Term Securities Lending Facility54  Monetary Policy Report to the Congress   February 2009